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JUSTICE DELAYED: TENANTS' QUEST FOR
ADMINISTRATIVE REDRESS IN THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Edward Allen*
INTRODUCTION

In January, 2001, Urna Walker, her extended family, and several neighbors
filed a tenant petition1 to protest their recent rent increases. Their apartments
were overrun by a biblical plague of mice and their once secure common areas
had deteriorated into a combat zone. Air conditioning was eliminated in summer;
heat was erratic in winter. Intruders inexplicably set fires in the common areas.
Falling ceilings were commonplace. Fresh out of Harvard Business School, the
principal owner testified that "getting a handle on the conditions was rough,
much harder than expected." Even the landlord's resident manager testified that
she would not live in the blighted complex.
Generally loath to represent tenants in administrative rent control matters,
student attorneys at the Housing and Consumer Law Clinic of the University of
the District of Columbia's David A. Clarke School of Law (hereafter Housing
Clinic) were nonetheless so inspired by the "Walker" tenants' pluck and grit that
they resolved to enter their appearance in this ongoing administrative matter. On
their advice, petitioners sought extensive damages as well as relief from the intended rent increase. Eighteen discrete hearings and a year later, the Hearing
Examiner finally issued a decision in September, 2002.2
* Professor of Law, University of the District of Columbia, David A. Clarke School of Law;
B.A., Amherst College; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center. The Author is particularly indebted
to Michael Piccinelli, law student, UDC David A. Clarke School of Law, for his steadfast and painstaking research and editorial support.
1 D.C. CODE § 42-3502.16(a) (2001), D.C. CODE § 42-3502.06(e) (2001), 14 D.C. CODE MuN.
REGs. § 14-4214 (2010).
2 Walker v. Cascade Mgmt., TP 2627,197 (RHC Jan. 14, 2005) (on file with author) summarizes
the procedural posture through 2005. After eighteen separate hearings the administrative law judge
("ALJ) ruled in favor of the tenants on most issues, which the tenants initially raised pro se, includ-
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The Hearing Examiner chronicled the tenants' travails in the dilapidated hous-

ing complex and concluded that there had been a "knowing and willing" reduction in services. Twenty-eight detailed findings alluded to the ubiquitous mice.
Yet, notwithstanding his depiction of the bleak living conditions,
the Hearing Ex3
aminer awarded the tenants stunningly meager damages.
Both parties appealed, with the tenants winning handily at the Rental Housing
Commission (hereafter RHC or the Commission) in a 2005 decision. 4 The Commission denied the landlord's appeal and remanded with clear instructions that
the relief on remand should more generously reflect the egregious conditions and
that treble damages were warranted based on the housing provider's "heedless

disregard" of its responsibility to repair in the face of ongoing housing code violations after ample notice. 5 Notably, the RHC Walker decision is one of the most
frequently cited decisions by current administrative law judges in tenant petition
cases. 6 Three years later, the Rent Administrator finally awarded one of its most
substantial judgments ever, including
generous compensatory damages, treble
7
damages and ample attorney's fees.
However, the Homeric pace of the proceedings had consumed seven years
with no end in sight. The Rent Administrator's ostensibly "final decision" was
recorded in D.C. Superior Court in April, 2008. By that time, the initial respondent housing provider had effectively ceased to exist as a legal entity after it
conducted an apparently legal, but nonetheless furtive, "ninety-five-five" sale.8
The tenants then faced the possibility that their delayed justice would be definitively thwarted. Worse, shortly after the 2008 decision was recorded the new respondent, the current landlord, filed twin motions to vacate both the Rent
ing the illegality of recent rent increases and the proper rent ceilings. Walker v. Cascade Park Apartments, TP 26,197 (OAD Sep. 30, 2002) (on file with author). The hearing examiner/Administrative
Law Judge from the Office of Administrative Adjudication (OAD) levied substantial fines against the
housing provider payable to the District of Columbia, awarded very modest actual damages to the
tenants, and substantial attorney's fees to David A. Clarke School of Law. The clients' damage awards
ranged from no monetary award to awards of approximately $2000, including treble damages. The
Commission, however, did reverse and on remand the tenants received exceedingly generous damages after more than seven years of litigation.
3 Walker v. Cascade Mgmt., TP 2627,197 (RHC Jan. 14, 2005).
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 See 5502 D St. Tenants v. Donald Howell, RH-TP-07-28887 (OAH, Aug. 5, 2008) (on file with
author).
7 Walker. v. Cascade Mgmt., TP 27,197 (RAD May 22, 2007) (Proposed Decision And Order)
(on file with author); Walker v. Cascade Mgmt., TP 27,197 (RAD Jan. 30, 2008) (Decision and Order)
(on file with author). Approximately $20,000 was awarded to each of the eight petitioners.
8 A ninety-five/five sale, whereby the owner of a property sells ninety-five percent of their
interest and retains five percent, does not meet the definition of "sale" in the Tenant Opportunity to
Purchase Act - leaving tenants without the opportunity to purchase before the transfer. D.C. CODE
§ 42-3404.02 (2001), D.C. CODE § 42-3405.03(b) (2001); Twin Towers Plaza Tenants Ass'n, v. Capitol
Park Assoc., 894 A.2d 1113 (D.C. 2006).
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Administrator's decision and the Superior Court's recorded judgment of the administrative judgment's final order. 9 The acting Rent Administrator took months

to issue a perfunctory order that transferred the housing provider's pending mo1 °
tion to vacate and all residual issues to the Office of Administrative Hearings.

As of January 2010, that case never arrived at OAH, but languished at RAD for
an additional twenty months.' Without a settled final order the Superior Court
vacated the judgment and dismissed the case.1 2 After asserting for months a new
order was forthcoming, the acting Rent Administrator finally issued an order de-

nying the respondents motion to vacate on March 24, 2010.13 The Walker petitioners still need an enforceable judgment from Superior Court, pending
respondent's decision to appeal to the Rental Housing Commission. They continue to voice their outrage and frustration.
The initial paltry damages and the interminable delays of the Walker case,

frustrating beyond any measure, set against the ongoing needs of tenants, impelled this study. This article examines whether administrative adjudication of
tenant petitions at the Rental Accommodations and Conversion Division
(RACD), re-designated the Rental Accommodations Division (RAD), 14 has af9 The Rent Administrator named the current housing provider as respondent pursuant to 14
D.C. CODE MUN. REGS. § 3906.2 in its decision dated January 30, 2008. Housing Provider argued that
he did not timely receive the decision and was thus unable to timely appeal. Walker v. Cascade
Mgmt., TP 27,197 (RAD Jan. 30, 2008) (Decision and Order) (on file with the author). Counsel for
the Housing Provider had neglected to change his address in the file and apparently never received
the decision. Filed two years earlier, his motion to withdraw from representing the housing provider
was never acted upon.
10 Before issuing the Order on May 20, 2009, Granting Petitioners' Motion for an Extension of
Time And Granting Parties' Request for Hearing on Motion to Vacate Decision and Order Adding
Cascade Park Partner's LLC as a Party, the Rent Administrator in a conference call suggested that
neither party would be happy with the decision and urged the parties to attempt to settle. The Housing Provider's attorney failed to attend the pre-arranged meeting.
11 As has always been the case in this matter, clinic students made persistent inquiries to the
Rent Administrator regarding the pending transfer. The Rent Administrator's modus operandi was to
state that the transfer was imminent. The Rent Administrator never apprised students that the matter
had actually never had been sent to OAH, but, on November 30, 2009, stated that there was a new
development which would be memorialized in an order by December 3, 2009.
12 Walker v. Cascade Park Apt., 2008 CA 002651 (D.C. Sup. Ct. May 18, 2009) (Order Dismissing Case Without Prejudice) (on file with the author).
13 Walker. v. Cascade Mgmt., TP 27,197 (RAD Mar., 24, 2010) (Order Vacating RAD May 20,
2009 Order and Denying Motion of Cascade Park Partners LLC To Vacate Decision and Order Adding Cascade Park Partners, LLC As a Party) (on file with author); Student attorney, Kimberly Pulick, status notes from August 2009 through December 2009 document the Rent Administrator's
promise of a decision (on file with the author).
14 As of October 1, 2007, the Department of Housing and Community Development (DHCD)
oversees residential housing regulations. Such oversight is tasked to DHCD's Housing Regulation
Administration (HRA), which is divided into two sections - the Rental Conversion and Sales Division
and the Rental Accommodations Division (RAD). Amongst other responsibilities, RAD processes
tenant petitions and transfers such petitions to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) for
adjudication. Administrative Law Judges (AU) at OAH schedule and hold hearings arising from

UNIVERSITY OF THE DisTRicr OF COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

forded effective relief for petitioners. More importantly, it assess whether the
present adjudicators, Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), and the enduring administrative appellate body, the
(RHC), are providing "just, speedy, and inexpenRental Housing Commission
15
sive" forums for tenants.
Although the immediate catalyst for this inquiry was the meager first award in
Walker and the interminable delays that followed and continue unabated into
their tenth year, the Housing Clinic had long viewed "rent control" adjudication
in the District of Columbia as a troubled venue for its clients. Since D.C. tenants
enjoy an unsurpassed bundle of rights and often generous jury verdicts in Superior Court, why adjudicate tenant grievances in a much-maligned administrative
forum that may award de minimis damages? A further concern was the languid
pace of the administrative appeals, exacerbated by shuttlecock remands, despite a
clear legislative mandate of expeditious decision making. 16 By the time the
Walker tenants prevailed on appeal four years had slipped away. Another three
years were lost to a remand that required neither hearing nor argument despite
student lawyers' zealous efforts to nudge the Rent Administrator by a relentless
flurry of inquiries.
This languid pace typified the Housing Clinic's prior RACD experiences. An
extreme example of this pattern was encountered in Rosenboro v. Askin 17 which
involved approximately twenty years of shuttlecock litigation of hearings, appeals
and remands. In that matter, the exasperated tenant petitioners, incensed by decades of delays, finally refused to communicate with their student lawyers, which,
in turn, eventually led to the Housing Clinic's withdrawal from their representation. No action has been taken on that case by the agency since the student lawyers withdrew.18 For its part, based on the frustrating delays of Rosenboro, the
Housing Clinic determined that it would only rarely accept tenant petition cases.
Beginning in 2005, however, the Housing Clinic received so many referrals of pro
tenant petitions. ALJs began hearing cases in October 2006. Aggrieved parties may appeal AJ decisions to the Rental Housing Commission (RHC). Appeals from RHC decisions may then be taken to
the D.C. Court of Appeals for review. Prior to October 1, 2007, the Department of Consumer and
Regulatory Affairs (DCRA) oversaw residential housing regulations. The Rental Accommodations
and Conversion Division (RACD) within the DCRA was RAD's predecessor and the Rental Accommodations Office (RAO) was RACD's predecessor. The Rent Administrator delegated his power to
administer hearings to RACD Hearing Examiners. These functions are currently performed by ALJs.
15 FED.R.CIv. P. 1, SuP. CT. Civ. R. 1, and 1 D.C. CODE MUN. REGS. § 2800.3 (2010) all require
a "just, speedy, and inexpensive" determination of every action and proceeding.
16 D.C. CODE § 42-3502.16(a) (2001) requires that the Rent Administrator render a decision
within 120 of the tenant's filing a tenant petition. D.C. CODE § 42-3502,16(h) (2001) requires that the
Rental Housing Commission render a decision within thirty days of a duly noted appeal.
17 Rosenboro v. Askin, TP 3991 & 4673 (RHC Feb. 26, 1993) (on file with author).
18 In 2005, per a telephone conversation, Respondent informed the author that no action had
been taken on the matter. No written opinion has addressed the matter since the Housing Clinic
withdrew from representation.
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se tenant petitions that the clinic decided to take a fresh look at the viability of
administrative adjudication. This Article will examine the potential advantages of
administrative adjudication, the chronic and persistent delays in administrative
adjudication, and the hurdles faced by pro se litigants. This is the first of two
articles examining the administrative venues available to aggrieved District of
Columbia tenants.

I. METHODS
The resources for this study are extensive, since both the RACD and the OAH
issue prolix written decisions. Typically ten to fifty pages, these administrative
decisions are ideal for bottom-up, empirical research. In theory, twenty-eight
thousand decisions and orders, 19 from sloppily culled boilerplate to painstakingly
wrought analyses, are available for inspection. 20 Detailed factual findings and
the conclusions that rationally flow from them 21 are a signal advantage of administrative decisions and a distinct rarity in Superior Court.
Given the voluminous decisions issued in the three decades, the scope of research necessarily had to be limited. 22 Thus, this article focuses on the most recent decade of Rental Housing Commission (RHC), Rent Administrator (RAD
or RACD), and Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) opinions,2 3 including a rivulet
19 The current Administrative Law Judges are using caption numbers in a series which begins
with 28,000, indicating that the agency has previously disposed of some 28,000 petitions, including
landlord petitions, during its approximate thirty-five years of existence. The author has read-or in
some instances skimmed-all available decisions and orders in the series beginning with 27,000, which
includes the time frame from approximately 2002 to 2007. The author also read most of the available
OAH substantive decisions available through November 30, 2009. Current decisions are readily available only through FOIA requests. FOIA responses may inadvertently omit some items.
20 The former and the current Rent Administrators, Raenelle Zapata and Odette Abraham,
made these available to me and even assisted in copying. Ms. Odette Abraham was particularly helpful and long on patience.
21 D.C. CODE § 2-509(e) (2001).
22 The current generation of rent control laws in the District of Columbia has been in effect
since 1974, when emergency legislation was passed. The successive acts, the Rental Accommodations
Act of 1975; the Rental Housing Act of 1977, D.C. CODE § 45-1681 (1980); the Rental Housing Act of
1980, D.C. CODE § 45-2501 (1981); and the Rental Housing Act of 1985, D.C. CODE § 42-3501.01
(2001), reenacted and modestly modified the initial act, The Rent Control Act of 1975. The current
law, The Rental Housing Act of 1985, as amended, is the fourth act in this series and was recently
amended in 2006. The Rent Control Reform Amendment Act of 2006, D.C. CODE § 3502.05 (2001).
Since the current numbers of administrative petitions is 29,000, one might assume that 29,000 petitions, or approximately 1000 a year, have been filed during the past thirty-five years. The numbering
is somewhat idiosyncratic and may not reflect the true number of filed petitions. Although most cases
are settled or dismissed for failure to prosecute, a substantial number have been adjudicated. There
may have been more contested tenant administrative adjudications than tenant trials in Superior
Court during the same time period.
23 The former Rent Administrators, Raenelle Zapata and Gracye Wiggins, generously provided
the author with bound volumes of decisions in the waiting room of the RACD offices. Similarly, the
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of older decisions that have remanded back to the Rent Administrator during
this period.2"
This investigation re-evaluates whether administrative adjudication actually
has been - and presently is - a viable, practical alternative forum for tenants litigating and seeking relief for blighted conditions. Tenant advocates have long answered that query in the negative by voting with their feet. Disparaging RACD
because of its interminable delays and uneven quality, advocates routinely opted
for any viable alternative, despite the forum's undeniable inducements, which in-

clude statutory attorney's fees, treble damages, and a menu of claims not cognizable in the Landlord Tenant Branch of Superior Court. Were they - as well as the
Housing Clinic - justified in shunning the RACD?
The Article also briefly examines whether the administrative forum has succeeded as a pro se friendly "people's court" by dint of its relaxed and inexpensive
procedures. No question exists that pro se tenants encounter choppy procedural
waters when they request jury trials. Given the Superior Court's arcana of required pre-trial statements and the attendant jury instructions, esoteric summary
judgment motions, and unending maze of incomprehensible procedure, can tenants more easily navigate the relaxed procedures at RACD\OAH and still ob-

tain meaningful relief?
This inquiry is especially timely because in 2006 the rent control landscape
changed in two dramatic ways that necessarily expanded the scope of my investigation. First, a promising new regime of Administrative Law Judges replaced the
beleaguered RACD Hearing Examiners. 25 Second, new administrative procedures and user-friendly amendments to the Rental Housing Act afforded the opportunity to examine, at its inception, the progress of a "new, improved" version
of administrative litigation. 26 As a result, the much reviled "old regime" of Hearing Examiners is compared with the less experienced but more highly touted suc-

cessor Administrative Law Judges. A core question in this article is whether the
new cadre of ALJs has corrected RACD's myriad deficiencies, most particularly,
by providing "just and speedy" decision making.

author reread all Rental Housing Commission decisions of the last decade as well as other pertinent
D.C. Court of Appeals decisions.
24 Pursuant to D.C. CODE § 42-3502.16(h) (2001), the Rent Administrator (RA) may issue
opinions in those matters even if the Rent Administrator did not preside at the hearing. However, the
RA must issue a proposed decision, presumably after listening to the hearing tapes. The parties may
make objections or exceptions before a final order is issued. This process is inherently timeconsuming.
25 As of October 1, 2006, the OAH hears and decides cases previously heard by the Rent Administrator. D.C. CODE §2-1831.03(b-1)(1) (2001).
26 The Rent Control Amendment Act of 2006, D.C. CODE § 42-3501.01-3502.23 (2001).
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Analysis is limited to tenant petitions, particularly those alleging housing code
violations, known in rent control argot as "reductions in services."'27 Mostly excluded from this analysis is: (1) the myriad tenant defenses to rent increases; (2)
the substantial exemption adjudication; (3) landlord petitions; (4) the inevitable
political debate and corresponding personnel issues within the agency, and (5)
the relative merits of various rent control amendments. 28 The study does address,

however, a variety of provisions, amendments, or rulings unique to the forum
that enhance or diminish tenants' rights.
II.

SUMMARY

My central and paramount conclusion is that delays, justice-denying delays,

have been and persist as the combined agencies' most fundamental failure; many
tenants, particularly those represented by counsel, have routinely refused to litigate administratively. Several legal service organizations declined to file tenant

petitions. As a direct result of those delays, persevering tenants such as the
Walker tenants are denied meaningful remedies. At no time in the last decade has
the Rent Administrator regularly met, or even come close to meeting, its statutory mandate to render decisions within 120 days of filing. 29 Hearing Examiners'
decisions were woefully delayed for three decades. The Rental Housing Commission's record is even more abysmal. Worse still, Dickensian delays reminiscent of
Jarndyce v. Jarndyce, characterize agency remands. 30 Although definitive conclu27 D.C. CODE § 42-3502.11 (2001), D.C. CODE § 42-3509.01(a) (2001), 14 D.C. CODE MUN.
REGS. § 4216.1 (2010); 14 MUN. REGS. § 4205.6 (2010). Although tenant petitions may contain a variety of claims, housing code violations remain the main subject of adjudication through 2009.
28 One such particularly contentious personnel issue-but not a part of this study-was the
termination of the Rent Administrator, Grayce Wiggins purportedly for her pro-tenant bias. She has
not been replaced on a permanent basis.
29 Supra, note 16.
30 CharlesDickens panned Courts of Chancery through his fictional case ofJarndycev. Jarndyce
which went on so long that even the litigants forgot when it began or what it involved. "Suffer any
wrong that can be done you rather than come here!" CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 3 (Pollard &
Moss 1884) (1853). Also:
Jarndyce and Jarndyce drones on. This scarecrow of a suit has, in course of time, become so
complicated that no man alive knows what it means.
The parties to it understand it least, but it has been observed that no two Chancery lawyers
can talk about it for five minutes without coming to a total disagreement as to all the premises. Innumerable children have been born into the cause; innumerable old people have died
out of it. Scores of persons have deliriously found themselves made parties in Jarndyce and
Jarndyce without knowing how or why; whole families have inherited legendary hatreds with
the suit. ...(A) long procession of Chancellors has come in and gone out; the legion of bills
in the suit have been transformed into mere bills of mortality; there are not three Jarndyces
left upon the earth perhaps since old Tom Jarndyce in despair blew his brains out at a coffeehouse in Chancery Lane; but Jarndyce and Jarndyce still drags its dreary length before the
court, perennially hopeless
Id. at 4-5.
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sions are premature, the ALJs have not overcome this regrettable legacy. Unfortunately, the Housing Clinic's experience is that ALJ decisions are issued more
slowly than at any prior time in the Agency's existence. Petitioners appreciate the
enhanced quality of ALJ adjudication, but remain united by their delay-induced
frustration.
My second conclusion is that hearings before the present OAH until now have
been insufficiently pro se friendly. In fact, new procedural requirements-prehearing submissions, certification of documents, motions for subpoenas-are in
some respects less accessible to pro se parties than former procedures. The cost of
copying registration files at RAD, a requisite for technical defenses to rent increases, may be prohibitive. Subpoenas are not easily obtained. Pre-hearing submissions are likely to perplex and intimidate the uninitiated. "Language line"
interpreters, in many ways a vast improvement over the incompetent and notoriously unreliable interpreters previously employed by RACD, are not readily accessible to mediating parties in need of discussing matters privately or preparing
rebuttal testimony. Finally, Al~s are reticent to assist unsophisticated pro se parties prove elements of their cases. In contrast to its dismal record with delays,
concern about making the
however, the agency has demonstrated substantial
31
agency more accessible for pro se litigants.

Third, ALJs, who assumed authority in 2006, are a vast improvement over
Hearing Examiners. The Housing Clinic's disaffection with Hearing Examiners
stemmed from: unacceptable judicial demeanor, 32 superficial and erroneous anal-

ysis, inadequate relief and untimely decisions. 33 In reversing Hearing Examiners,
the Rental Housing Commission noted an array of easily avoidable errors: failure
to afford due process; 34 wholesale copying of proposed decisions, mostly from

31 Jannelle Smith Esq., Legal Assistant, Administrative Law Judges, Presentation to Housing
Clinic at the University of D.C.-David A. Clarke School of Law (Oct. 27, 2009). She discussed the
importance of the pro bono committee that was working on access issues for pro se parties.
32 In one instance, an irate Hearing Examiner, Thomas Word, unaware that a hearing was
scheduled in one of his cases, threw chairs around the hearing room. Interview with Louise Howells,
Professor of Law, University of the District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 8, 2010). In another case, Hearing Examiner Gerald Roper advised the author and
supervising attorney that he routinely subjects students through rites of passage by his particularly
aggressive questioning. In a third instance, the Hearing Examiner did not show up for the hearing and
was hours late on several other occasions.
33 Redman v. Graham, TP 27, 104 (RHC Jan. 31, 2003) at 4 (failure to timely act on motion to
disqualify); See also Nezhadessivandi v. Alpha Street LLC, TP 25, 091 (RHC Jan. 16, 2003) at 8
(failure to consider a motion to continue).
34 Stets v. Featherstone, TP 24, 480 (RHC Aug. 11, 1999) (Hearing Examiner decided an issue
without testimony and based on contested proffer of Housing Provider's attorney); Boney v. Locke,
TP 27, 644 (RHC, Nov. 30, 2005) at 2,7 (the Hearing Examiner raised and decided issues previously
withdrawn by petitioner without notice to respondent).
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housing provider's attorneys; 35 persistent failures to make comprehensive or accurate findings and conclusions; 36 the lose of agency hearing records; 37 and obvi-

ous mistakes of law.38 ALJs, by contrast, have successfully resolved hundreds of
cases as of December 30, 2009-a significant number for their relatively short
tenure. An informal survey of the most frequent practitioners reveals an overwhelming appreciation for the enhanced quality and professionalism of the
ALJs. 39 But ALJs have not solved the most lingering and fundamental problem
that has long plagued the agency: decisional delays. As a result, the Housing

Clinic remains reluctant to represent clients in tenant petitions at OAH.4 °
IH.

THE POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES

OF ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION

Unlike the D.C. Landlord Tenant Court, RACD had - and OAH has - several
trappings of a housing court. Both landlords and tenants may file petitions.4 1 A
steady stream of landlords and tenants crowd the RAD offices daily and query
"contact representatives" on the esoterica of navigating the rental housing laws.4 2
Landlords ("Housing Providers" under the Act) may petition the Rent Adminis35 Collins v. Schwartz Mgmt., TP 23, 571 (RHC Feb. 10, 2000) at 7 ("Wholesale adoption of an
advocate's position, without any indication of an independent analysis by the hearing examiner, offends the adjudicatory process").
36 Stets, supra note 35, at 11(no analysis of four pronged test for exemption); Mersha v. Marina
View Tower Apartments, TP 24, 302 (RHC, July 23, 1999) at 9 (omissions and misstatements in Examiner's summaries of testimony).; Harris v. Wilson, TP 28, 197 (RHC July 12, 2005) at 6 (the Hearing Examiner used funny math unrelated to the rent paid in the case before him); Montgomery v.
Offurum, TP 27, 676, (RHC April 18, 2005) at 11 (insufficient or inaccurate findings by Hearing
Examiner); Woodner v. Enobakhare, TP 27, 730 (RHC Feb. 3, 2005) at 12-5 (inaccurate calculations
based on wrong methodology to calculate refunds and plain error in interest calculations).
37 Sanders v. Keyes, TP 12, 127 (RHC Dec. 29, 2000) at 8 (agency inaction and losing the record
resulting in fifteen years of delay); Jerome Mgmt., Inc. v. Rental Hous. Comm'n., 682 A.2nd 178, 1846 (D.C. 1996) (agency delay and loss of records constituting special circumstances resulting in denying
of attorney's fees to petitioner).
38 Mary Burns v. Charles E. Smith, TP 23,962 (RHC June 18, 1999) (decision based on unsworn
testimony and hearing examiner spoke to parties and determined one issue of the record); Ruffin v.
Sherman, TP 27, 982 (RHC July 29, 2005) at 8 (plain error in the interest calculations.); Hamlin v.
Daniel, TP 27, 626 (RHC June 10, 2005) at 4 (Hearing Examiner erroneously denied a refund owing
to the tenant under controlling law).
39 The author conversed with lawyers at the following: Law Students in Court; Legal Aid Society; Neighborhood Legal Services Program; Bread for the City; Legal Counsel for the Elderly; Eric
Von Salzen; Richard Luchs, Eric Rome; Morris Battino; Brian Lederer; Carol Blumenthal; Josh
Greenberg; and Bernard Gray.
40 The Clinic would certainly represent clients on matters that cannot be litigated elsewhere,
that is, when the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies. See Drayton v. Poretsky, 462 A.2d 1115
(D.C. 1983). The Clinic might also make an exception when, on a pre-existing case, an ALl has a
track record of relatively expeditious decision making.
41 D.C. CODE § 42-3502.01(2001).
42 Legal advice by non-lawyers is as problematical as it is inevitable in the context of staff
persons explicating RACD filing requirements. It appears to the author in his numerous visits to
RACD during the fall of 2005 that large numbers of landlords seek and obtain specific case-related
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trator for extraordinary building-wide rent increases, most commonly "hardship,"
"substantial rehabilitation," and "capital improvement" petitions.4 3 Although
these petitions-not within the scope of this study-may result in draconian rent
increases, such filings have been dormant until recently because rent ceilings
commonly exceeded fair market rents, at least until 2006. Even since the new
2006 Amendments took effect,4 4 the overwhelming majority of ALl decisions
have been tenant petitions. Tenants may use a virtual, but declining, arsenal of
claims and defenses to defeat rent increases.45
Tenants also seek administrative redress for a variety of affirmative claims,
unavailable in the Landlord Tenant Branch. As in Superior Court, tenants may
assert housing code violations affirmatively to seek appropriate refunds. 46 Other
reductions in services, such as elimination of storage and laundry rooms, roof top
decks, balconies, and parking, are not cognizable in the Landlord Tenant
Branch. 47 Tenants may, moreover, challenge the facial validity of notices to
quit.4 8 Among tenants' most frequent claims are affirmative assertions of
retaliation.49

Why file tenant petitions when D.C. tenants already enjoy a bundle of rights in
Superior Court that are among the strongest tenant protections in the United
States? Civil litigation has manifest advantages over administrative adjudication,
legal advice from RACD rather than paying a modest consultation fee to a competent attorney. Tenants are likely referred to the Office of Tenant Advocate (OTA) to assist them with their petitions.
43 D.C. CODE § 42-3502.12 (hardship), D.C. CODE § 42-42-3502.14 (substantial rehabilitation),
and D.C. CODE § 42-3502.10 (capital improvements). The most common rent increases, annual adjustments and vacancy increases, do not require petitions. In the main, at least before the 2006
amendments, landlords have found these increases, particularly vacancy increases, adequate to raise
rent ceilings and rent charged without additional petitions.
44 The Rent Control Reform Amendment Act of 2006, D.C. Law 16-109 (codified at D.C.
CODE 42-3501.01 - 3502.23 (2001)) (abolishing rent ceilings, substantially changed annual and vacancy
increases and providing enhanced protection for elderly tenants and tenants with disabilities).
45 The Housing Clinic tallies about a dozen viable, generic defenses, generally not at issue in
this paper, to rent increases, which are quite distinct from those based on housing code violations.
These include, inter alia, insufficient time between rent increases, D.C. CODE § 42-3502.08(g) (2001);
failure to be properly licensed, D.C. CODE § 42-3502.05 (2001); 14 D.C. MUN REGS. §4101 (2010);
failure to "perfect" annual and vacancy increases, D.C. CODE § 42-3502.13 (2001); D.C. CODE § 423502.08(g) (2001); failure to register after new ownership or management company, 14 D.C. MUN.
REGS.§4102 (2010); numerous technical deficiencies on the notice of rent increase, D.C. CODE § 423502.08(f) (2001); failure to file the notice of rent increase, D.C. CODE § 42-3502.05(g)(1) (2001); poor
service of rent increase, 14 D.C. MUN. REGS. §4205.(2010); and the almost obsolete increases over the
rent ceiling, D.C. CODE § 42-3502.06(a) (2001).
46 D.C. CODE § 42-3502.11 (reduction in services or facilities); D.C. CODE § 42-3509.01 (penalty
for reduction in services or facilities); 14 D.C. MUN. REGS. §4205.6 (2010) (existence of prolonged
housing code violations); 14 D.C. MoN. REGS. §4216 (2010) (petitions alleging substantial housing
code violations).
47 Miles Realty v. Garrett, 292 A.2d 152 (D.C. 1972).
48 14 D.C. MuN. REGS. §4302 (2010).
49 D.C. CODE § 42-3505.02; 14 D.C. MON. REGS. §4303 (2010).
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a well known fact even to first year law students. Tenants sued for nonpayment of
rent may exert financial pressure on undercapitalized landlords by withholding
and posting their escrowed rent in the court registry until trial. 50 Modest discovery is also routinely available in the Landlord Tenant Branch. 51 The most fundamental advantage of court proceedings, flatly unavailable at RACD/OAD, is that
52
tenants may seek immediate injunctive relief to eradicate substantial violations.
Superior Court equity jurisdiction also encourages tenants to enforce settlement
agreements by court styled as consent decrees (or consent judgments); breaching
landlords may well feel the sting of the court's contempt power. By contrast,
administrative judges are powerless to issue sanctions.53 Finally, Superior Court
judges, unlike several former administrative Hearing Examiners, are frequently
distinguished by their analytical acuity, litigation experience, and the respect of
their peers.
Notwithstanding the tangible benefits of civil litigation, tenants continue to file
a virtual torrent of tenant petitions at RAD for a variety of compelling reasons.
First, OAH/RAD adjudication requires no filing costs. Second, the forum attempts to be user-friendly. Form petitions, for example, contain comprehensible
checklists, bereft of legal gobbledygook. 54 Third, RAD employees are trained to
assist parties seeking redress. That assistance has been dramatically enhanced by
the recently constituted and assertive Office of Tenant Advocate (OTA).55
Fourth, relaxed rules of evidence facilitate efficient and informal case presenta56
Fifth, aadministrative hearings are altogether less daunting than formal
tion.
court proceedings for pro se parties. In theory, solicitous adjudicators can assist
uninitiated parties in presenting their cases. Elderly persons or persons with disabilities, easily intimidated by the daunting hurly burly of Landlord Tenant court,
57
are more comfortable in the intimate and relatively private hearing rooms.
Sixth, some viable tenant claims for reductions in services, roughly akin to breach
of contract actions, are more comprehensive than the traditional Javins defenses
(breach of the implied warranty of habitability as a result of housing code viola50 SCR LT 12-I (outlining the procedure for protective orders in nonpayment of rent cases).
51 SCR-LT 10 (discovery may be granted by the court for "good cause shown" either by motion
or the agreement of the parties).
52 "Administrative agencies do not have inherent equitable power." Prince Constr. Co v. D.C.
Contract Appeals Bd., 892 A.2d 380, 384 (D.C. 2006) (citing Ramos v. D.C. Dep't of Consumer &
Regulatory Affairs, 601 A. 2d 1073 (D.C. 1992)).
53 Id.
54 Tenant Petition Form, http://www.dhcd.dc.gov/dhcd/lib/dhcd/services/rental/tenantpetition09.
pdf.
55 Office of the Tennant Advocate, http://ota.dc.gov/ota/site/default.asp (last visited Mar. 31,
2010).
56 The DCAPA standards are brief; evidence must be relevant, reliable and non repetitive.
D.C. CODE § 2-509(b) (2001). •
57 Telephone interview with Jennifer Berger, Legal Counsel for the Elderly, in Washington
D.C. (May 2, 2008).
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tions) and counterclaims available in Superior Court.5" Seventh, RACD damages
for reduction in services may exceed Superior Court void lease or warranty of
habitability awards by a factor of three as a result of treble damages. 59 Eighth,
civil penalties may be levied for "knowing and willful" violations. 60 In the unlikely event that they are collected, the penalties in principle may serve both to
deter unlawful behavior and to induce favorable settlements. Ninth, attorney's
fees are freely awarded to prevailing tenants who request them, and, at least potentially, provide the most formidable settlement leverage available to tenants.61
Tenth, successful rent rollbacks, available only at RAD, preserve affordable units
and prevent displacement.62 Given the Act's limited grounds for eviction, 63 housing providers may attempt to evict by raising rents to unaffordable levels. OAH
can, at least in theory, provide prompt tenant redress. Finally, tenants are empowered by "taking the landlord to court," rather than the reverse.6 4

58 Twyman v. Johnson, 655 A.2d 850 (D.C. 1995).
59 DC CODE § 42-3509.01(a) (2001). Relatively few ALJ cases have awarded treble damages;
nonetheless, like punitive damages, treble damages are major incentives to tenants with strong cases.
Most of the recent cases awarding such damages were tried without housing provider representation
or were ex parte. See e.g. Wynn v. Williams, RH-TP-28659 (OAH April 30, 2007); 5502 D St. Tenants
v. Donald Howell, RH-TP-07-28887 (OAH Aug. 5, 2008). See Part II of this article for critical observations of the ALJ\RHC analyses of treble damages and fines.
60 D.C. CODE §42-3509.01(b) (2001).
61 The author contends that tenant attorneys' failure to seek statutory attorney's fees is a glaring and fundamental disservice to their clients. By not pursuing fees, tenant representatives sacrifice
substantial settlement leverage, deterrence possibilities, and funds for future litigation. In Evans v.
Jeff D., 475 U.S 717 (1986), Justice Stevens' central insight is: "For aught that appears, it was the
coercive effect of respondents' statutory right to seek a fee award that motivated petitioners' exceptionally generous offer." Id. at 739. Even Superior Court jury demands do not afford the tenants as
much leverage as administrative attorney's fees. In one such OAH case awarding modest damages,
Judge Nicholas Cobbs awarded the Housing Consumer clinic $20,000 in attorney's fees in a case in
which the tenant's award was approximately half the much. Benitez v. Ogden Gardens, RH-TP 0829189 (OAH, April 1, 2009); see also Judge Margaret Mangnan's award in Chamorro v. Panza RHTP-07-29127(OAH Feb. 6, 2009).
62 D.C. CODE § 42-3509.01(a) (2001).
63 D.C. CODE 42-3505.01 (2001) limits bases for eviction to the reasons stated in the statute.
Under the best of circumstances, it is difficult to evict D.C. tenants who have the funds to the pay the
rent.
64 New legislation, the "Tenant Access to Justice Reform Act of 2009," proposed by
Councilmember Mary Cheh, may provide another tenant friendly forum by expanding jurisdiction in
the Landlord Tenant Branch to hear tenant initiated complaints for damages and injunctive relief. The
proposed legislation would mandate hearings on those matters within twenty-eight days of filing. A
hearing on the bill was held before the Committee on Housing and Workforce Development on November 30, 2009. Public Hearing on B18-104 Tenant Access to Justice Reform Act of 2009 Before the
Committee on Housing and Workforce Development, Council Period 18, (Nov. 30, 2009).
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IV.

THE CHRONIC PROBLEMS OF RENTAL HOUSING ADJUDICATION

A.

Delays by the Rent Administrator

Litigation delays are the most dominant and abiding failure of rental housing
adjudication. Every stage of "rent control" litigation is marked by excessive delay; the most notorious delays occur after actual adjudication. While some delay
is inevitable and endemic to all litigation, the Rental Housing Act's (hereinafter
the Act) two-level appeal procedure inevitably prolongs adjudication. 65 Other
frequently cited reasons are less defensible and include administrative disarray,
re-organization, employee turnover, and insufficient staff and funding. Vacancies
at the Rental Housing Commission result in quorum-less inactivity at the appellate level. 66 Less inevitable but nonetheless aggravating delays are the time-consuming shuttlecock remands from the RHC to the RACD/RAD. 67 Housing
provider appellants, moreover, are well aware that time consuming appeals are
tactical victories, as they delay the tangible impact of an adverse judgment or
blunt an opponent's enthusiasm for further litigation. Housing providers defending tenant petitions may assume that years will pass before they ever feel the
tangible bite of an adverse judgment. 68 Tenants, likewise, may delay landlord petitions for years. Delays, however, do not benefit the responding party symmetri69
cally because some landlord petitions provide for provisional increases.
The Act requires that decisions be issued within 120 days of filing. 70 That
deadline may never have been met in a contested, actually litigated case. 7 1 Various Rent Administrators have recognized that such delays are unacceptable and
attempted to issue decisions within six months of filing. 72 Unfortunately, remands
14 D.C. MUN. REGS. §3802 (2010) (right to appeal to Rental Housing Commission), D.C.
§ 42-3502.19 (2001) (right to appeal to District Court of Appeals).
66 D.C. CODE § 42-3502.02 (2001).
67 See Jerome Mgmt. Inc. v. D.C. Rental Hous. Comm'n, 682 A.2d 178, 182 (D.C. 1996), no
delay in any current case can be more exasperating than the indefensible delays in the Walker case
discussed supra note 2. See Walker v. Cascade Mgmt., TP 2627,197 (RHC Jan. 14, 2005) (on file with
author)
68 However, no advantage accrues when tenants are posting their monthly rent into the registry
of the court pursuant to a stay of the proceedings pending final adjudication of the tenant petition.
Drayton v. Poretsky, 462 A.2d 1115 (D.C. 1983).
69 See e.g. Hardship petitions D.C. CODE § 42-3502.12 (2001).
70 D.C. CODE 42-3502.16(a) (2001). "The time may be extended only by written agreement" of
the parties.
71 In the last four years worth of contested cases, the time limit was not met in any case which
entailed a contested hearing. The time limit was not met in any case handled by the Housing Clinic
from 1976 to the present. Some administrative delays are, of course, requested by the parties for
scheduling conflicts and preparation purposes.
72 Interview with Keith Anderson, Acting Rent Administrator, District of Columbia Department of Housing and Community Development, in Washington D.C. (Summer 2006). Mr. Anderson
also attended a July 2009, community forum on rental housing and stated to the author that he was
shocked to hear that the delays were still so prevalent. According to him, alleviating the backlog was
65
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of time-worn cases were consigned to the slowest track. 73 Obtaining decisions in
cases heard by Hearing Examiners no longer employed at the Agency frequently
took years.74

The Rent Administrator issued more than 300 tenant petition opinions from
December 2003 to October 1, 2006:75 approximately forty-three were substantive,
"merits" decisions; eighty settled; and nearly 120 were dismissed as withdrawn or
for failure to appear. Many of those cases also appear to be unfiled or de facto
settlements. During that three year period, the Rent Administrator and her delegated Hearing Examiners took from two months to more than a year after initial
filing to issue substantive decisions; the average time was slightly shorter than six
months. Although these "turnaround" times far exceeded statutory requirements,
some veteran Hearing Examiners in this period churned out boilerplate decisions
more quickly than either their predecessors or current successors.7 6 On the other
hand, of the thirty-four presumably more complex tenant petitions decided by the
Commission in 2005, the Rent Administrator spent an average of 13 months to
issue decisions. 77 The lingering matters that have not been transferred to OAH
receive languorous and shabby treatment. As reported in a recent RHC decision 78 , a petition filed in 2003 did not merit a decision by an RAD Hearing Examiner until five years later. Similarly, the Housing Clinic discovered in
November 2009 that despite his written order, the Rent Administrator did not
successfully transfer the residual Walker matters to OAH, yet another misstep in
that interminable saga.
B.

Delays by Administrative Law Judges

ALJs took responsibility for hearing rental housing matters in late 2006 and
deserve substantial credit for parsing statutes and regulations previously unthe primary purpose of the transfer of cases to OAH. Interview with Keith Anderson, Acting Rent
Administrator, District of Columbia Department of Housing and Community Development, in Washington D.C. (July 2009).
73 See Walker v. Cascade Mgmt., TP 2627,197 (RHC Jan. 14, 2005) (on file with author)
74 Id.
75 The three binders from this era begin with T 27,000 and end at TP 28,663. Why there are only
300 files is a mystery. It seems likely that many more cases were filed and adjudicated. Some are still
unresolved. The present ALJs issued more than 300 opinions in 2009 alone, of which about 100 were
on the merits.
76 One reason for the relatively expeditious turnaround is that hearing examiners encouraged
counsel to write proposed decisions. At least two hearing examiners had at least twenty years experience and were well versed in their own boilerplate.
77 Three reasons may explain why these cases took longer at the Rent Administrator level.
First, they included cases decided by new OAD\Als who routinely took longer as they were learning
the law. Second, some cases had been remanded twice. Third, appealed cases were likely more complex and zealously litigated than non-appealed matters.
78 Jassiem v. Woodner, TP 27, 720 (RHC Sept. 4, 2009) at 2.
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known to them.79 The complexities of DC rental housing law are notorious; the

uninitiated, including counsel, tread warily. Moreover, the ALJs' present "clearance rate" is impressive, as they apparently resolve and close as many cases as are
currently filed. 80 ALJs also deserve unstinting praise for encouraging settlement
and successfully mediating scores of tenant petitions.8 1 In addition, many more
cases are resolved by settlement or abandonment. 82 That is all good news; the

bad news of decisional delays continues to undermine the credibility and potential value of OAH adjudication.
Based on decisions currently available and a measure of reasonable extrapola-

tion, it is likely that more than 200 tenant petitions actually "went to trial" or
were otherwise adjudicated from 2007-2009. 83 OAH's record for issuing timely

decisions in those adjudicated cases is poor. Therefore, the Housing Clinic has
resolved once again to avoid administrative adjudication at OAH on matters than
84
can be litigated in other forums-namely housing code violations. In fact,

OAH's poor record for issuing timely decisions was the nearly unanimous, core
79 As of October 1, 2006, the Office of Administrative Hearings ("OAH") began holding hearings and issuing decisions in cases that were previously heard and decided by the Rent Administrator.
D.C. CODE § 2-1831.03(b-1) (2001). OAH has 33 judges, some of whom hear rental housing cases
exclusively. Many do not hear rental housing cases at all as the agency is responsible for many other
administrative matters. One signal advantage of OAH decision making is that it is an independent
agency, unlike former Hearing Examiners who worked for the Rent Administrator.
80 FY10 PERFORMANCE PLAN OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS, http://capstat.oca.dc.
gov/Pdf.aspx?pdf=http://capstat.oca.dc.gov/docs/fylO/OAH.pdf. A cursory calculation based on FOIA
requests revealed the ALJs resolved more than 300 cases in 2009 alone. More than 200 of these were
summary dismissals.
81 Id. OAH recognized that there might be an efficient way to resolve more cases without
hearings. OAH in Initiatives 1.1 and 1.2 resolved to implement a mediation program as well as a
"court oriented case management system." Id. Seventy five percent of all ALJs have completed ADR
or mediation training. OAH has put prodigious energy into implementing its mediation program.
From my uneven FOIA records, approximately forty cases were mediated in the first eleven months
of 2009. ALJs who taught a class for the Housing Clinic in 2009 emphasized the techniques of mediation more than the fine points of administrative trials.
82 Copies of the 2009 non-merits decisions gathered from our FOIA requests suggest that about
eighty additional matters were settled prior to the hearing and another sixty were dismissed with or
without prejudice, probably as a result of settlements. A disturbingly high amount of cases, thirtyseven, were dismissed for failure to prosecute or appear.
83 Due to the uneven quality of decisions tendered in FOIA requests, precise numbers are
unavailable, but the clinic has copies of approximately 100 tenant petition decisions on the merits
from 2009 (including only eleven months of 2009) sixty from 2008, and eighteen from 2007. Since the
clinic has not received more than half of its tried cases, the author must assume that many other cases
tried in former years also await decisions. For the sake of perspective, the landlord tenant branch of
D.C. Superior Court issued 159 judgments from non jury trials in 2008.
http://www.dccourts.gov/dccourts/docsfDCC2008AnnualReport-StatisticaISummary.pdf#page=ll.
84 The decision is regrettable because the actual adjudication experiences have been first-rate
quality pedagogically. On information and belief, the Housing Clinic has actually tried more tenant
petitions at OAH than most other tenant advocates. The clinic, of course, will accept matters that
have already been filed or matters that will not be heard in Superior Court.
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concern of participants at the recent Community Forum on Rental Housing at
OAH.8 5 Because of its persistent and apparently ever increasing inability to write
seasonable decisions and ensure expeditious justice, the forum has not lived up to
its promise. The unremitting delays render it ineffective for many tenants and

advocates. Final resolution is as crucial in litigation as quality in many instances.
In the context of annual rent increases, transient tenants, and dire conditions,

justice delayed may well be justice denied. Solely because of the delays, litigants
should seek relief for housing code violations in Superior Court and avoid administrative adjudication until ALJs are able to issue decisions in a reasonably timely
manner.

86

The Housing Clinic has represented tenants in at least thirty-five matters
before OAH.8 7 Ten have been adjudicated. In only three cases of the Clinic's
cases have administrative law judges issued reasonably timely decisions. In two
of these adjudicated cases, the presiding judge had a solid record of issuing decisions within six to eight months of the close of evidence.8 8 In the third matter, the
first of a series of related cases, the AU wisely promised to deliver a speedy
decision based on the parties' good faith representation that the decision would

likely trigger their prompt settlement of the remaining matters.89 Within three
85 Faith Mullen, who studies access to justice issues in the context of OAH, organized a forum
on July 16, 2009 on Rental Housing Adjudication at OAH. Approximately forty people turned in preforum surveys and it was overwhelmingly the biggest concern of the participants who were tenants
and landlord lawyers as well as tenants and landlords. Telephone Interview with Faith Mullen, Bellows Scholar, Columbus School of Law, in Washington D.C. (Oct. 16, 2009).
86 It has long been an article of faith for supervisors in the housing clinic that Superior Court
LT bench trials were to be avoided if possible because Superior Court Judges awarded relatively small
abatements for defenses and counterclaims. Furthermore, settlement leverage obtained either by requesting a jury trial in Superior Court or by requesting attorney's fees at OAH greatly enhanced
settlement negotiations. Because of the clinic's frustration with the duration of OAH proceedings as
well as the need for injunctive relief, the clinic recently represented a client in a bench trial in the L/T
Branch, Stancil v. Bugg-Bey, L&T 023510-09 (Oct. 30, 2009), and achieved excellent results (Seventy
percent abatement on a counterclaim, no rent owing, and injunctive relief for severe conditions)
within a few months of the initial court date. Vytas Vergeer at Bread for the City also reports excellent results in recent bench trials that occurred in the LT Branch. Email Exchange/Telephone Interview with Vytas Vergeer, Attorney, Bread for the City, in Washington D.C. (January 12, 2010). In
one case, for example, one tenant received nearly $14,000 of her rent back from the court registry,
plus another $19,000, for reduction in services. Another tenant received $45,000-$17,000 back from
the registry and $28,000 in cash for reduction in services. Both tenants also received orders to repair
and illegal rent increases eliminated. Id.; Kenyon House, LLC v. Teresa Mendez, 2006 LTB 7388, and
Kenyon House, LLC v. Eva Mendez, 2006 LTB 7392.
87 The Housing Clinic settled at least thirteen discrete matters in 2009.
88 Chamorro v. Panza, Trustees, RH-TP-07-29127 (OAH May 5, 2009); Lawson v. Sellers, RHTP 29,437 (OAH Nov. 2009). In these cases, both decisions were issue approximately eight months
after the close of evidence. Some delays in Chamorrowere attributable to students, who were initially
unfamiliar with the law, and needed a Spanish interpreter.
89 Judge Nicholas Cobbs issued a fifty-nine page decision in Benitez v. Ogden Gardens, RH-TP
08-29189 (OAH April 1, 2009), three months after the hearing was completed.
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months of the close of evidence, the AU issued a decision and the seven related

matters were quickly settled.
Four of the Clinic's petitions remain on a woefully and inexcusably slow track
after full and lengthy hearings. One client, disgusted by the mouse-infestation in
his apartment and the porous security in his building, was concerned about his
daughter's safety. The client filed a petition forty-one months ago. 90 The evidence closed more than two years ago. The client has received and paid three
additional, presumably unlawful rent increases, but cannot effectively challenge
them until a decision. 9 ' The presiding ALJ promised to issue a written order
granting petitioner's motion for partial summary judgment more than thirty
months ago. In another matter, involving primarily legal issues particularly suitable for summary judgment, twenty-four irate tenants have been waiting in frustration for a dispositive summary judgment decision that the ALJ promised to issue
a year ago. 92 As the table below indicates, the Clinic's four pending petitions
were filed an average of twenty-six months earlier than this writing; even more
on the four petitions were completed an average of eighdistressing, all litigation
93
teen months ago.
Months
Between
Close of
Argument
and 3/1/10

Months
Between Date
Filed and
3/1/10

Judge

Date Filed

Date of
Final
Argument

06-28799

Juan Avila v.
Ahmed, Inc.

J. Dean

9/26/06

11/30/07

26

40

07-29063

Juana Lizama
and Jose
Hernandez

J. Barber

9/13/07

6/4/08

20

29

08-29345

Ahamad, et.
al. v. Ahmed,
Inc.

J. Sharkey

6/27/08

12/4/08

14

19

08-29343

Seyoum, et al.
v. Ahmed,

J. Nash

6/27/08

10/29/08

15

19

Tenant
Petition
Number

Name

Inc.

90 Avila v. Ahmed, Inc., RH-TP-06-28799. Mr. Avila filed the petition pro se and then sought
assistance from the Clinic.
91 To curtail statute of limitations objections, however meritless, it is tempting to file additional
tenant petitions in these matters based on accruing rent increases that are based on previously challenged rent levels, several of which AUs have acknowledged orally are unlawful.
92 Ahamad, v. Ahmed, Inc., RH-TP-08-29345 (filed on June 27, 2008.) In this case, the housing
provider, without filing a required petition for reduction in services, pronounced that the tenants were
thenceforth responsible for paying their own electricity and accordingly switched to individual meters.
In order to expedite a decision, the tenants refrained from filing claims about additional reductions in
services.
93 It should be noted that, unlike the tables for all 2008 and 2009 decisions, which appear just
below, the four remaining clinic cases have not been decided as of March 1, 2009. These time durations will continue to increase in Jarndycean fashion.
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Regarding these unresolved cases, the Clinic has no adequate response to the
persistent and increasingly shrill inquiries from clients. Our clients' faith in their
attorneys is stretched to the breaking point. Other practitioners, who otherwise
praise the improved quality of the AU_ decisions, grumble mightily at the contin94
uing delays.
The tables below were culled from approximately 170 adjudicated decisions
from 2007 to 2009. The tables amply illustrate that the Clinic's experience has
been typical. In 2007, the average reported case was resolved eleven months after
hearing and a respectable five months after hearing. In 2008, the average reported case was not resolved until seventeen months after filing and nine months
after the close of evidence. In 2009, ALJs decided more cases, but regrettably
took more time to decide them; the average case was not decided until twenty
two months after filing and fifteen months after the close of evidence. Nearly half
of the decided 2009 cases were not been decided within two years of filing.95
Total Number of Tenant Petitions Decided
Total Number of Tenant Petitions Decided Within 1 Year of
the Close of Evidence
Total Number of Tenant Petitions Decided Within 1-2 Years
of the Close of Evidence
Total Number of Tenant Petitions Decided Within 2-3 Years
of the Close of Evidence
Total Number of Tenant Petitions Decided in Greater Than
3 years of the Close of Evidence
Total Number of Tenant Petitions Decided in Which No
Data is Available From the Close of Evidence
Average Time of Disposition From the Close of Evidence

2008
60
36

2009
87
37

11

30

0

14

0

0

13

6

8 months 15 months

Several observations regarding the ALJ's inability to issue decisions are appropriate. First, there is an obvious correlation between quick decisions and produc-

94 One attorney, Carol Blumenthal, Esq., for example, informed me on December 16, 2008 that
she had finished "a one issue" hearing, her only full hearing before the OAH, some sixteen months
earlier and had yet to receive a decision in that matter, despite her requests. The decision was finally
issued on December 30, 2008. Telephone Interview with Carol Blumenthal, Esq., Blumenthal &
Cordone PLLC, in Washington D.C. (Dec. 16, 2008).
95 It would a mistake to assume that the ALJs are deciding matters more slowly in 2009 than in
2007. In 2009, AUs are still issuing decisions on matters that were filed in 2006 and 2007. The relatively quick decisions issued in 2007 are only a small proportion of the matters heard that year. Several of 2009 decisions involved cases transferred from RAD in 2006.
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Total Number of Tenant Petitions Decided
Total Number of Tenant Petitions Decided Within 1 Year of
Filing
Total Number of Tenant Petitions Decided Within 1-2 Years

2008
60
23

2009
87
15

20

29

8

30

3

7

6

6

of Filing

Total Number of Tenant Petitions Decided Within 2-3 Years
of Filing

Total Number of Tenant Petitions Decided in Greater Than
3 Years of Filing

Total Number of Tenant Petitions Dicided in Which No
Data is Available From Filing

Average Time of Disposition From Filing

16 months 22 months

tivity. Three judges that handle 96matters relatively quickly also handle a
substantial proportion of the cases.

Secondly, the petitions rarely entail complex legal matters; typically pro se parties dispute the validity of rent increases or request refunds based on severe conditions. More complex matters address: failures to perfect annual and vacancy
increases, retaliatory acts, the validity of the small landlord exemption, and multi97
ple tenants filing petitions for building-wide refunds and rollbacks. In the main,
the ALJs' analyses rely on apposite Commission and clear D.C. Court of Appeal's authority; issues of first impression are relatively rare with the result that
many decisions are correspondingly short. In addition, more recently filed cases
are not obligated to deal with some of the more baffling and contentious aspects
of the Act that were eliminated in 2006.98 In marked contrast to former Hearing
Examiners, ALJs occasionally analyze or clarify unresolved matters with consummate command of the Act and its precedents as well as an analytical thoroughness that the Rental Housing Commissioners might envy. Still, much legal
analysis in the majority of petitions relies heavily on well plowed boilerplate. The
inevitable conclusion is that routine decisions, comprising the majority of the

96 Judges Mangan and Pierson handle cases most expeditiously. Judge Cobb, who has written
many decisions, follows closely behind.
97 14 D.C. MUN. REGS. §14 (2010); 14 D.C. MUN. REGS. §4204.9,-4204.10 (2010) (perfection), D.C. CODE § 42-3505.02 (2010) (retaliation), D.C. Code § 42-3502.05(a)(3) (2010) (small landlord exception).
98 The ongoing debate as to what constitutes "perfection" of annual increases per Sawyer v.
D.C. Rental Hous. Comm'n, 877 A.2d 96 (D.C. 1996), is no longer an issue on any rent increase take
after the 2006 amendments. The Rent Control Reform Amendment Act of 2006, D.C. Law 16-109
D.C. CODE § 42-3501.01 (2006). Rent ceilings have also been eliminated in the amendments. Id.
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cases, can be issued quickly. At 99
least three judges write decisions of variable
complexity within a year of filing.
Third, ALT conducted mediation, OAH's primary stratagem for moving cases,
is necessarily time-consuming and inevitably deflects Al~s from hearing cases or
writing decisions. "Closing" vast numbers of non-adjudicated cases has merit, but
does nothing to allay the backlog of adjudicated matters.
Finally, AL inexperience is another explanation for the early delays immediately after the transition of RAD cases to OAH. Only one current AU, who is
not currently hearing rental housing cases, has had apposite experience as a practitioner.10 0 The well-respected Principal Administrative Law Judge for rental
housing matters closely analyzed the Act for years as a Rent Commissioner, but
as an AU has written relatively few substantive rental housing opinions; thus,
missing a prime opportunity to provide intellectual leadership in written opinions. The AL~s should be able to increase their ability to complete and issue
opinions as they gain experience.
In short, ample reason exists to be encouraged by the quality of ALJ decisions,
but there is also ample reason to fault OAH for its incorrigible and ever mounting delays. In the majority of adjudicated cases, OAH delays cause petitioners
and their advocates to lose their resurgent enthusiasm for the forum. Delays
cause substantial prejudice to petitioners. Confidence in administrative adjudication is shattered: some clients state that they despair of taking any grievance to
any court or even calling a housing inspector based on their OAH experience. 10 1
Clients, likewise, lose confidence in their counsel. If there is reasonable solace or
explanation for the delays to either the Walker tenants or the current OAH petitioners, the Housing Clinic has not found it. Practical problems for petitioners
awaiting decisions abound: tenants concurrently defending a suit for possession
may be required to spend a half a day to reach the court registry every month for
as long as it takes for petitions to wend their way through the desultory administrative process. 10 2 When new housing code issues arise during the course of litiga99 Judge Pierson and Judge Mangan nearly always complete decisions within a year of filing. In
2008 and 2009, Judge Cobbs wrote numerous and varied opinions.
100 Administrative Law Judge Elizabeth Figueroa had not been assigned to rental housing cases
before the fall of 2008, and then only as a mediator. As a practitioner, she litigated all facets of tenant
landlord law for more than two decades. OFFICE OF AMDINISTRATIVE HEARINGS, BIOGRAPHY ELIZABEHT FUERGO ADMINSTRATIVE LAW JUDGE (Dec. 10, 2009), http://oah.dc.
govtoah/cwp/view,a,3,q,605657.asp. This is not to suggest that all judges should have experience in
order to effectively hear such matters. Pertinent experience and knowledge assists any presiding
judge. It is, however, notable that the Superior Court stressed the desirability of pertinent family
court experience for its recently hired family court magistrates.
101 Clients have asked my colleague, Alysia Robben, "what is the point of all of this?" Interview with Alysia Robben, Clinical Instructor, University of the District of Columbia David A. Clarke

School of Law, in Washington D.C. (January 8, 2010).
102 One of the Walker tenants, who lived in Southeast near the beltway, spent hours getting to
and from the Landlord Tenant Branch to pay his protective order before that matter was dismissed.
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tion perceived to be interminable, a sense of futility - based on the delays supplants petitioners' initial zeal. When housing providers request new rent increases petitioners cannot fathom how yet another increase can be piled on old
unlawful increases. Petitioners likewise cannot comprehend how a judge can
orally rule that an increase is unlawful, but not seasonably memorialize that statement so that it is binding. As in Walker, tenants cannot grasp how liable respondents can disappear or corporations dissolve midway through the apparently
unending litigation.
C. Delays by the Rental Housing Commission

The Rental Housing Commission 10 3 is unrealistically charged with issuing decisions "within 30 days after an appeal has been filed." 10 4 However, even if the
statute had granted a year to write a decision, the Commission would have rarely

met the mandate. The Commission has repeatedly ruled that "time periods for
agency actions are directory and not mandatory." 10 5 Litigants, moreover, bear
some responsibility for early delays, by belatedly retaining attorneys, negotiating
lethargically, or waging "scorched earth," delaying litigation tactics. When, however, the Agency is at fault, as it commonly is, parties have no effective remedy.
Writs of Mandamus are unwieldy, reluctantly granted, and beyond the ken of
most pro se parties106

Delays in issuing decisions by the Rental Housing Commission have been unremitting for the last decade. In 1999, the Commission issued 114 orders and
decisions in tenant petitions, only 24107 of which were on the merits.10 8 Of the
103 The Rental Housing Commission has been in existence since 1981. See D.C. CODE §§ 454012 (expired), 45-3502.01. 1 (2001). In addition to hearing cases in the parties' first appeal, the Commission issues regulations governing the Rental Housing Act. See D.C. CODE § 42-3505.02(a)(1).
104 D.C. CODE § 42-3502.16(h) (2001). Here the statute is unrealistic, given the considerable
investment of time by Commission members. However, even if the statutory time periods were reversed as they probably should be, so that the Rent Administrator was afforded thirty days to issue a
decision and the Commission was afforded 120 days, the Commission decisions would not even be
close to timely.
105 Greene v. Urquilla, TP 27, 604 (RHC Jan. 14, 2005) at 5; Lyons v. Pickrum, TP 27,616,
(RHC Feb. 1, 2005) at 12 ("A directory statutory time period is a 'provision in a statute rule of
procedure or the like, which is a mere direction or instruction of no obligatory force and involving no
invalidating consequence for its disregard....') (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 414 (5th ed.
1979)).
106 Parties occasionally attempt to expedite opinions by means of Writs of Mandamus pursuant
to D.C. App. R. 21(b)(1). Although the D.C. Court of Appeals rarely grants extraordinary writs in
which parties must show "gross abuse of discretion" in the context of agency delay, the mere filing of
the writ and the predatory language of the order may nudge the Commission to expedite the decision.
My interviews with tenant lawyers revealed that they are reluctant to bring writs against the agency
deciding their case on the merits particularly in close cases.
107 As noted, some cases were appealed more than once thus dramatically increasing their total
litigation time. Bertha Redmond v. Majerle Mgmt., TP 23,146, (RHC, June 4, 1999), for example, had
been appealed and remanded once before and been in litigation for eight years. A lingering attorney's
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twenty tenant petitions on the merits, nine were remanded for further proceedings. On average, four years elapsed from initial filing to Commission decision on
appeal. During that four year period, several cases were remanded more than
once.
In 2000, the Commission issued a modest seventy-four decisions and orders,
on average twenty-eight months after the initial filing. Only twenty-three decisions were substantive or substantial by any measure. Of these, more than half
were remanded. 0 9 Four cases of particularly ancient lineage have been shuttlecocked between the Commission and the RACD for years. 110
In 2001, a total of thirty-six decisions were issued by the Commission. Two
were major substantive decisions; two were a combination of procedural and substantive decisions, and the others were procedural. The four substantive decisions
were typically issued within twenty-six months of initial filing. Including the pro
forma procedural decisions, 111 the Commission took twelve months on average
to render decisions after the notice of appeal.
In 2002, the Commission issued 106 orders and decisions, approximately
twenty-one of which were substantive and substantial. Ten of those were remanded. Decisions were issued approximately twenty-two months after initial
filing.
In 2003, the Commission issued 122 decisions and orders, on average thirty
months after the initial filing. Of these, only twenty-eight were substantive and
substantial. Twelve of the substantive decisions were remanded.
fees issue was addressed fifteen years into the litigation after several appeals and remands, Augustus
Reid v. William Sinclair, Sr. TP 11,334, (RHC Sept. 1, 1999).
108 The merits decisions are normally fewer than fifteen pages and rarely an issue of first impression, but one decision in 1999 was forty-eight pages, Bertha Redmond v. Majerle Mngmt, TP
23,146, (RHC June 4, 1999).
109 In 2000, the Commission considered a grand total of seventy-four decisions. Approximately
fifty-one of these were procedural with minimum complexity. This does not mean that the Commission has considered seventy-four discrete cases. The Commission often revisits one case several times
addressing each procedural motion.
110 In Sanders v. Keyes, RH-TP 12,127 (RHC Dec. 29, 2000), for example, the proceedings
were labyrinthine. This was the third appeal for a tenant petition filed on April 30, 1985. See also
Joyce v. Webb, TPs 20,729 & 20,739 (RHC July 31, 2000); Brookens v. Hagner Mgmt., TP 4284 (RHC
Aug. 31, 2000); and Youssef v. Cowan, TP 22,784 (RHC Sept. 27, 2000).
111 The distinction between "substantive" and "procedural" is often elusive as the Rental
Housing Commission styles many non-substantive opinions as "decisions." A substantive decision on
the merits analyzes evidence and legal arguments of the underlying claims and defenses and normally
results in a final decision. Procedural decisions are often interim and collateral and address mostly
routine matters: motions to file briefs late, motions to add a party, motions for continuances, motions
to withdraw as attorneys, denials of motions for summary affirmance, motions for attorney's fees,
motions for stays of the judgment, etc. Occasionally, such orders may result in final judgments: motion to dismiss because of settlement, motion to dismiss for failure to appear, etc., but they do not
require more than routine analysis.
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In 2004, the Commission's productivity declined resulting in only seventy-eight
decisions, twenty-eight of which were substantive. Of the substantive decisions,
more than half (eighteen) were remanded. The Commission issued decisions on
average three years after petitions were filed, and twenty months after the Rent
Administrator issued decisions.
In 2005, the Commission issued eighty-two decisions and orders, thirty-four of
which were substantive. Those decisions were written an average thirty-one
1 12
months after the petitions were filed and a year and a half an appeal was filed.

The only matters meriting relatively expeditious handling (within a year of filing)
were "commission initiated reviews." 113 More than half of these matters
(nineteen) were remanded for further proceedings.
In 2006, the Commission issued twenty-seven decisions and orders, ten of
which it deemed "decisions," but only six of which were actually on the merits.

As it issued multiple orders in seven cases, the Commission actually issued orders
in only eighteen distinct cases. Of the five tenant petitions decided on the merits,
forty months had elapsed since filing, and twenty months hand elapsed since the
Rent Administrator issued a decision.11 4 Three of the five cases were remanded

for further proceedings.
In 2007, the Commission issued twenty-five decisions and orders, seven of
which it styled "decisions." Of the five tenant petitions decided on the merits,
thirty-five months had elapsed since petitioners had filed their petitions, and

twenty-five months had elapsed from the Rent Administrator's decision. 1 15 Four
decisions were remanded for further proceedings.
In 2008, the Commission issued fifteen "decisions and orders" and thirty-one
routine orders.' 16 Most of the decisions addressed non-substantive or well settled
substantive matters.11 7 Of the substantive decisions, only one was complex, in112 At least two of these decisions had been previously decided by the Commission and remanded back down the hearing examiner.
113 14 D.C. MUN. REGS. § 3808 (2010).
114 See Bedell v. Clarke, TP 24,979 (RHC April 19, 2006); Norwood v. Peters, TP 27,678 (RHC
Ju 14, 2006); Hammer v. Manor Mgmt. Corp, TP 28,006 (RHC May 17, 2006); Covington v. Foley
Prop., Inc., TP 27,985 (RHC June 21, 2006); Grantv. Gelman, TP 27,995 (RHC Mar. 13, 2006).
115 See Wade v. Park Road Assoc. & Morris Mgmt., TP 27,631 (RHC Mar. 27, 2007); McAnney
v. Laurence Smith, TP 27,938 (RHC Apr. 24, 2007) (Reconsidered May 29, 2007); Daly v. Tippet, TP
27,718, (RHC Junel, 2007); Shamma v. Cafritz Co. TP 28,720 (RHC June 1, 2007); Ryan& Ryan v.
Carmel Partners, TP 28, 367, (RHC, Sep. 27, 2007).
116 The thirty-one orders consist of routine matters including: withdrawals of counsel or appeals (five); enlargements of time (eight); decisions on requests for stays (eight); etc. The Commission
did write a somewhat more substantial order addressing attorney's fees that diverged somewhat from
its recent decisions. Tenants of 710 Jefferson Street, N.W. v. Looney, SR 20,089 (RHC Dec. 10, 2008).
117 For example, in Damesh v. Lauren Bladen-White et al, TP 28,571 (RHC Oct. 3, 2008), the
Commission considered the sufficiency of the notice of appeal. In BARAC Co. v. Samuel Benkuski,
TP 28,123 (RHC Oct. 3, 2008), the Commission dismissed a case as moot because of a settlement.
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volving some issues of first impression. 118 An average of forty-eight months had
elapsed since initial filing and twenty-five months had elapsed since the decision
was rendered in the hearing below. For the first time, the Commission heard
matters appealed from the OAH. Seven of the fifteen decisions were
remanded. 119
As of the end of September 2009, the Rental Housing Commission had written
only about nine decisions and forty additional brief orders in that year. Most of
the matters were straightforward; only two decisions involved factual complexity
or novel issues.1 20 Two decisions were remanded for extensive rewriting, yet
three had been remanded previously and at least one had three prior remands.
Only twenty-two discrete cases were addressed by the Commission. Many of the
cases had multiple, pro forma orders.
On average, these cases had been initially filed five years earlier; one of them
containing relatively uncomplicated facts and issues 12 1 was finally put to rest by
the Commission after thirteen years. The Commission took an average of sixteen
months after the most recent decision below at OAH or RAD/RACD to render
an opinion. Encouraging, but atypical, two matters were handled within a couple
of months of an OAH decision.
Shuttlecock remands, a seemingly endless cycle of appeals and remands, are a
major cause of the incessant delays. Despite the requirement that remands receive expedited and priority treatment, 122 remanded cases have traditionally
been afforded little priority; rather RAD/RACD frequently fails to register that it
has regained jurisdiction of the remanded case. As is evident from the chart below, the Rental Housing Commission remands vast numbers of cases-from
twenty five percent to sixty percent of its "merits cases", and on average, approxi1 23
mately forty percent of all its merits decisions.
118 Tenants of 710 Jefferson St. N.W. v. Steve Looney, SR 20,089 (RHC Dec. 10, 2008).
119 Nuyen v. Guzman, TP 27, 452-27, (RHC 9, 2008). The Commission recently urged that
matters be decided expeditiously on remand, citing 14 D.C. MUN. REGS. § 3822.2 which states that
"any case remanded by the Commission to the Rent Administrator shall receive expedited and priority treatment."
120 See 1773 Lanier Place N.W. Tenants' Ass'n v. Laurence Drell\Lanier Assocs., TP 27, 344
(RHC Aug. 31, 2009) (discusses the issue of damages by RHC); see also Borger Mgmt. v. Lee, RHTP-06-28, 854 (RHC Mar. 6, 2009).
121 Dias v. Perry, TP 24, 379 (RHC Aug. 31, 2009).
122 14 D.C. MUN. REGS. § 3822.2 (2001).
123
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STATE OF THE JUDICIARY

2008 (2008), http://www.dc-

courts.gov/dccourts/docslDCC2008AnnualReport-StatisticalSummary.pdf#page=1.
The D.C. Court
of Appeals remands a relatively high percentage of its "merits" decisions if the dispositions in civil
and agency cases in 2009 are any guide. Id. As of October 13, 2008 about thirty-three matters were
remanded out of thirty-nine cases the court reversed. About five of those remands entailed no action
for the court below other than entering judgment. In the same period, forty-seven civil cases were
affirmed, although the ratio might have been dramatically altered if summary affirmances were considered. Id.
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For the last five years, the Commission has most frequently remanded cases
for the following reasons: insufficient and reasoned findings as required by the
D.C. Administrative Procedure Act (at least eight such cases); conclusory and
insufficient findings for bad faith (at least three such cases); 124 conclusory and
insufficient findings for "knowing and willful behavior, 1 25 (at least four such
cases) which is a precondition for assessing civil fines; plain error in the calculation of interest 2 6 (at least five such cases); missing tapes (one case) of the hearing below foreclosing the possibility of adequate review without a hearing de
novo;12 7 and failure to conduct a full hearing based on the erroneous conclusion
that the property was exempt.' 2 8

Is there a viable solution to frequent and time consuming remands, given the
numerous shortcomings of the adjudicators below? While the need for remand
has diminished because of the current Administrative Law Judges ("AJ")more
careful and thorough writings, the Commission should still set time limits of thirty
days for remands of limited complexity.' 29 Moreover, hearings de novo on exemption matters could be avoided altogether if OAH required ALJs to make
findings of fact on all issues raised by a petitioner even if the ALJ concludes that
the unit at issue is exempt. 130 Obvious math errors and interest errors could be

corrected by the Commission without a remand. Tenant advocates could avoid
unnecessary remands by urging their clients to drop any claims for administrative
fines-or possibly even retaliation.
top priority by RAD and OAH.

3

' Finally, remanded matters should be given

124 See e.g. 1773 Lanier Place Tenants v. Laurence DrellfLanier, TP 27,344 (RHC Sep. 9, 2009).
125 See e.g. Id, at 91.
126 See e.g. Nuyen v. Guzman, TP 27, 452- 27, 454 (RHC May 9, 2008). ,
127 See e.g. Hammer v. Manor Mngmt. Co., TP 28,206 (RHC Mar. 23, 2006).
128 See e.g. Sarzynski v. Ross, TP 28,162 (RHC Apr. 3, 2008).
129 Even if it does not have authority to order the OAH to abide by its time limits, the Commission could use language similar to that of Courts of Appeal when they deny writs of mandamus, e.g.
"We are confident that the remand will be completed within Sixty days."
130 Such a procedure would obviate further fact finding and the Commission would not need to
remand the matter at all.
131 As the author will show in Part II of this Article, tenants should not seek fines in their
petitions. They are not entitled to collect them; the city will not collect them; and the ALJs' failure to
apply the standards in sufficient detail, will likely result in a remand.
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Rental Housing Commission Delays
"Merits" Decisions
Remanded for
Further Proceedings

Average Time From
Initial Filling to
RHC Decision

Year

Total Orders and
Decisions Issued

"Merits" Decisions

1999

144

24

9

48 months

2000

74

23

12

28 months

2001

36

4

0

12 months

2002

116

21

10

22 months

2003

122

28

12

30 months

2004

78

28

18

36 months

2005

82

34

19

31 months

2006

27

6

3

40 months

2007

25

5

4

35 months

2008

46

15

7

48 months

2009

49

9

2

60 months

As evidenced above, the Commission's productivity has declined since 2003.
Few of those decisions addressed issues of first impression. More than half of the
matters were remanded for further proceedings. In stark contrast, in 2007, the
D.C. Court of Appeals issued 1,837 opinions, memorandum opinions, orders, and
judgments addressing a wide spectrum of civil and criminal law. It resolved more
than 6,000 additional, procedural, and substantive motions and petitions for rehearing en banc.132 In 2007, the D.C. Court of Appeals took an average of
twenty-one months to issue an opinion from the time of filing an appeal, 3 3 and
an impressive six months from oral argument to reach a decision.' 34 Nevertheless, the Court has its own backlog troubles; from 2006 to 2009, Judge Vanessa
Ruiz took an average of 564 days from argument to decision. 135 Chief Judge Eric
Washington, who averaged 305 days from argument to decision in the same time
1 36
period, has pledged to solve the problem.

The Court of Appeals has frequently admonished the Commission for its "protracted proceedings.' 137 The court observed that ."(t)he wheels of justice have
132 THE DisTRicr OF COLUMBIA COURTIS: 2007 STATISTICAL SUMMARY (2007), http://www.dccourts.gov/dccourts/docs/DCC2007AnnualReport-StatisticalSummary.pdf. This included 349 opinions
646 memorandum opinions, 136 judgments, and 706 orders. As to motions and petitions, the court
resolved 4,431 procedural motions, 1,467 substantive motions, and 157 petitions for hearings en banc..
133 Id. In 2007, the average and median time on appeal were 645 and 505 days respectively.
134 Id. (finding the time from argument to decision: average-185 days; median-twenty days;
time from briefing to argument: average-210, median-204).
135 Jordan Weissmann, Slow Times at D.C. Court, NATION LAW JOURNAL, Mar. 8, 2010 at 17.
136 Id.
137 Joyce v. D. C. Rental Hous. Comm'n, 741 A.2d 24, 27 (D.C. 1999)

JUSTICE DELAYED

ground slowly," 1 38 noted that a "case was proceeding on a labyrinthine route
through the administrative process," 139 and found one proceeding to have had an
"extraordinary and tortured history., 140 On at least one occasion, the Court of
Appeals denied treble damages because a "combination of agency reluctance and

agency delays in the appeal process" justified a single award. 141 Contrastingly,
although it noted an abiding concern with agency delays, the reviewing court still
refused to limit treble damages when the petitioner did not complain below.' 4 2

By contrast with appellate judges, Rental Housing Commissioners are required to be experts on just one complex statute and its considerable decisional
progeny. The relatively narrow focus ought to enhance productivity rather than
impede it. A considerable portion of the Commission's case load is devoted to
routine procedural matters that could easily be addressed by paralegals, law stu43
dent interns, or full time clerks.'
Prima facie "good cause" has long existed to abolish the Rental Housing Commission, a notion which briefly gained favor from Mayor Fenty and some members of the City Council. 144 Tenant advocates, along with the Commission itself,
stemmed the criticism in part by contending that the informal procedures of the
Commission were less intimidating and burdensome for pro se advocates than the
Court of Appeals or intermediate appeals to a Superior Court Judge.' 4 5 Advocates also praised "the (three decade) expertise of the Commission. "146 Aware of

the chronic backlog, advocates hoped that they might play a role in reforming the
Commission, not in abolishing it.147 Even more persuasive was Chief Judge Lee
Satterfield's letter to Chairperson Vincent Gray and his "unusual appearance" at
the budget hearing evaluating the proposal; Judge Satterfield opposed the trans-

fer for several reasons: (1) the additional costs to Superior Court; (2) the delays
138 Tenants of 1255 New Hampshire Ave. N.W. v. D.C. Rental Hous. Comm'n, 647 A.2d 70, 71
(D.C. 1994).
139 Goodman v. D.C. Rental Hous. Comm'n, 573 A.2d 1293, 1298 (D.C. 1990).
140 Id. at 1299.
141 Temple v. D.C. Rental Hous. Comm'n, 536 A.2d 1024, 1038 (D.C. 1987).
142 Harris v. Rental Hous. Comm'n, 505 A. 2d 66, 71 (D.C. 1986).
143 See D.C. Code § 42-3502.02(d) (2001) (requiring DHCD to employ necessary staff members, and requiring three law clerks). On information and belief, a full staff has not been hired.
144 Kathryn Sinzinger, Mayor: Abolish Rental Commission, The Common Denominator, Mar.
24, 2003, http://www.thecommondenominator.com/032403_newsl.html. In 2003, Mayor Anthony Williams recommended abolishing the Rental Housing Commission as a budget-cutting proposal. After
an outcry from tenant advocates, Williams withdrew the recommendation. Id.
145 Id.
146 Public Oversight Hearing Before the Commrtee on Public Services & Consumer Affairs
(Apr. 1, 2009) (testimony of Anne M. Smetak, Staff Attorney, Affordable Housing Initiatives, Washington Clinic for the Homeless). The author of this article was persuaded by advocates that no better
alternative existed and signed a petition to preserve the Rental Housing Commission.
147 Interview with Patty Mulahy-Fugere, Director, Washington Center for the Homeless, in
Washington D.C. (April 15, 2009).
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inherent in the transition; and (3) the court's long-standing deference to an
agency which has primary jurisdiction.1 48 The Commission survived, as did its
trickle of decisions. Opponents of abolishing the RHC have made no efforts to
"fix it."
Practitioners remain frustrated with the Commission. A brief and unopposed
argument in favor of affirming a Hearing Examiner's decision to dismiss for failure to prosecute in July 2007, was decided nearly a year later in a brief, boilerplate decision. 1 49 Legal Aid and Legal Counsel for the Elderly similarly received

a decision following their administrative appeal in a Substantial Rehabilitation
petition argued in 2004.150 In 2008, Bread for the City attorneys received a Commission decision of a petition initially filed in 2002, and argued on appeal in
2004.151

In two of these matters, the attorneys have moved on to new

employment.
In late 2009, the newly constituted Commission wrote a singularly comprehensive and thorough decision concerning a variety of matters first raised by
nineteen tenants in a petition filed nine years earlier and last heard by the Rent
Administrator seven and one half years earlier. 152 Predictably, the matter was
remanded for comprehensive findings as to refunds, treble damage, and fines."'
It is reasonable to predict that matter could continue another five to ten years if
all appeals are pursued. 154 It is absurd to litigate a dispute about conditions and

rent increases between landlords and tenants for twenty years. The Commission,
like the ALJs, must find ways to expedite the appeal-remand shuttlecock litiga148 See Letter from Lee Satterfield, Chief Judge, District of Columbia Superior Court, to Vincent Gray, Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia (on file with author); Press Release, Office
of Chairman Vincent Gray, Gray Leads Passage of Budget that Gets School Reform Back in Track,
Recognizes Role of Charter Schools & Ensures Separation of Valued Community Services, Among
Other Cuts Restored (May 12, 2009) available at http://www.dccouncil.us/gray/PDF/Budget%20Passes
%205-12-09.pdf. The letter expands the following brief summary: "(t)he Court opposes the proposed
legislation because it shifts the costs of the RHC to the Courts' federal appropriation, substitutes the
Court's judgment for that of the RGHC in rental housing decisions in contravention of the intent of
the D.C. Administrative Procedure ACT (DCAPA. D.C. Code S. 2-501-2-511and does not benefit the
administration of justice and litigants' right to review."
149 Schreiber v. Burgdorf, TP 27, 561 (RHC May 28, 2008).
150 See Tenants of 710 Jefferson St., N.W. v. Looney, SR 20, 089 (RHC Dec. 10, 2008).
151 Guzman v. Nuyen, TP 27, 452 (RHC May 9, 2008).
152 1773 Lanier Place. N.W. Tenants' Ass'n v. Laurence DrelllLanier Assocs., TP 27, 344 (RHC
Sep. 9, 2009).
153 Id. at 89-91 Although the calculations will be based on the existing record, that record for
nineteen tenants is likely to be extensive, if not voluminous. The remand on trebles and fines is predictable, as Part II of this article will show, because few Hearing Examiner findings and conclusions as
to trebles and fines survived Commission scrutiny on appeal.
154 The Rent Administrator might use one to two years, if the tenants are much more successful in obtaining a decision than the Walker tenants discussed here. The Commission routinely takes
several years to decide cases once they are appealed. In the unlikely event that there are no further
remands, appeals to the D.C. Court of Appeals could take another two- to three years.
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tion. As in Walker, "justice delayed" prejudices the petitioning party. Extremely
long appeals bewilder both tenants and landlords; subsequent rent increases are
inevitably based on an already disputed and challenged increase.
Currently, the Commission has not issued a decision since September 2010

because all of the Commissioners' terms have expired. 1 55 Pending cases have not

been argued and cases that have been argued are not being decided. In January
2010, advocates prodded the Council of the District of Columbia to fill the vacant

positions. 156157At the time of this writing, not one position on the Commission has

been filled.
In summary, the RHC's ability to issue decisions in the last decade has been a
record of persistent and dismal failure. To its credit, Commission decisions are
much more carefully analyzed than prior RACD decisions and are frequently
affirmed by the D.C. Court of Appeals. 1 58 But this strength is depleted by its

dilatory practices. The Commission has rendered a mere eighteen substantive decisions a year. Second, statutory time limits are routinely disregarded and afford
litigants no remedy. Third, recurrent delays are exacerbated by the large number

of Commission remands, which comprise about half their caseload. As in
Jarndyce v. Jarndyce, these matters all too often disappear into the bowels of the
RAD. Fourth, boilerplate procedural orders comprise the bulk of reported decisions and should be delegated to paralegals or full-time law clerks. There are
often four or five related pro forma orders for one case in a year. Fifth, delays
are, unfortunately, endemic to much administrative practice,' 59 but not inevita-

ble. Sixth, these problems are being exacerbated because the Commission's work
155 Phone Interview with Latonya Miles, Contact Representative, Rental Housing Commission
in Washinton, D.C. (Mar. 29, 2010).
156 Letter from Anne M Smetak, Staff Attorney, Affordable Housing Initiatives, Washington
Clinic for the Homeless, et al., to Marion Barry, Chair, Committee on Housing and Workforce Development, Council of the District of Columbia (Jan. 25, 2010) (on file with author).
157 To be fair, the responsibility to appoint and confirm Rental Housing Commissioners belongs with the Mayor and Council of the District of Columbia. D.C. CODE § 42-3502.1(a) (2001). The
delay in appointments, no matter who is to blame, prejudices a party just the same as a slow decision
as it will ultimately increase a case's time to disposition.
158 Sawyer Prop. Mgmt. of Md., Inc. v. D.C. Rental Hous. Comm'n, 877 A.2d 96 (D.C. 2005).
Commissioners do not have access to transcripts of the hearing below as do appellate judges. By
contrast, they routinely listen "at Mickey Mouse speed" to tapes of witness. Filed briefs are frequently of shoddy quality and succinct to a fault. In spite of that, the Commission has a creditable
affirmance rate. Even if the opinions are not of high quality, the D.C. Court of Appeals would generally defer to the Commission's interpretation of "the statutes it administers and the regulations its
promulgates." Jerome Mgmt. Inc. v. D.C. Rental Hous. Comm'n, 682 A.2d 178, 182 (D.C. 1996)
(holding that the D.C. Court of Appeals will not defer to the Commission's interpretation of the
statute it administers if the interpretation "is unreasonable or embodies a 'material misconception of
the law"').
159 Persistent delays were notoriously rampant in fair housing cases at HUD. The D.C. Court
of Appeals has also criticized other administrative agencies, such as the Office of Human Rights
involved in administrative adjudication. Administrative law treatises no longer state that quick deci-
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has halted due to a lack of appointed Commissioners. When the inevitable appointment of new commissioners occurs, the body will be faced with a formidable
docket.
D. Insufficient Pro Se Friendliness

The overwhelming majority of tenant petitioners proceed pro se in actually
adjudicated cases." 6 Both parties are often unrepresented. 6 1 When only one
party had counsel, it was twice as likely to be the Housing provider. 162 The numbers are similar for cases that were resolved by settlement or abandonment: in
nearly half of the cases, neither party had counsel; 163 in about one- fourth of the
cases, both parties had counsel.' 6 4 Where only one party had counsel, it was three
times more likely to be the landlord. 6 5
Compared with the characteristic tumult of Landlord Tenant Court proceedings for unrepresented parties, there is much to admire about pro se OAH proceedings. Litigants are spared the trauma of crowded courtrooms and imminent
evictions; matters are heard when scheduled; one ALJ gives her full attention to
the matter at hand; and the parties are not rushed in order to reach all matters on
a crowded docket. On the other hand, the pro se petitioner faces the formidable
challenges of deciphering the law. The D.C. Court of Appeals has readily acknowledged that the various Rental Housing Acts are consistently complex: rent
increases can be challenged for a "multitude of reasons;' 66 the various Acts'
terminology "are not characterized by the most "luminous clarity,"' 167 provisions
of the Act may be "cryptic;"' 168 new rules "are not paragons of clarity; ' 169 "a
rollback of rent is a mysterious creature;"' 170 and even "judges considering the
sion making is an advantage conferred by administrative adjudication. 2 RICHARD J. PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 12.1 (2010).
160 In eighty-two cases which contained this information in 2009 that were available to the
author, tenants appeared pro se sixty-four times, or about seventy eight percent of the time.
161 In forty-two of the eighty-two adjudicated cases where this information was available. In an
additional nine cases the petitioning tenant had counsel, but the housing provider did not.
162 Housing Providers had the only attorney in twenty-two out of the eighty-two cases, while
tenants had the sole attorney in only nine of the eighty-two cases.
163 Of 185 matters resolved in 2009 available to the author eighty-two had no lawyer, fortyseven had lawyers for both tenants and housing providers, forty-two had representation only for the
Housing Provider, and fourteen had representation only for the tenant.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Parrecco & Parrecco v. D.C. Rental Hous. Comm'n, 855 A.2d 327, 333 (D.C. 2005).
167 Winchester Van Buren Tenants Ass'n v. D.C. Rental Hous. Comm'n 550 A.2d 51(D.C.
1988).
168 Yu v. D.C. Rental Hous. Comm'n, 505 A.2d 1310, 1313(D.C. 1986).
169 Id. at 1314.
170 Afshar v. D.C. Rental Hous. Comm'm, 504 A.2d 1105, 1106 (D.C. 1986).
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Act must 1 accustom themselves to encounters with the esoteric and the
17

arcane."
The interlocking acts and regulations are labyrinthine when "procedural rules
are confusing enough. ' 172 Thus, the Court of Appeals applied the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction because of "the relative complexity of the issues raised by
such challenges [to rent increases] in light of the workload of the L&T
Branch.' 173 Procedure is equally labyrinthine; the D.C. Court of Appeals noted
that the proceedings in an exemption case "now in (its) seventh calendar year,
have an extraordinary and tortured history."' 174 Even practitioners flounder on

occasion in face the multiple Acts, the regulations, Chapters 28 and 29 of the
OAH regulations, the D.C. Administrative Procedures Act, hundreds of Rental

Housing Commission cases, and scores of decisions from the D.C. Court of Appeals. Some provisions confound experienced housing providers and Hearing Examiners.'

75

Much needs to be done to make the doctrine comprehensible and the

process accessible and user-friendly.
The Court of Appeals recognizes that "lay persons, operating without legal
assistance, initiate and litigate" tenant petitions. 176 Of the available Hearing Examiner decisions considered in this study, only about a third of the landlords and

one sixth of the tenants were represented by counsel. As noted, more tenants,
about twenty two percent in adjudicated cases 1 7 7 and twenty nine percent in settled and abandoned cases, had counsel when appearing before ALJs in 2009.178

In many of the fiercely contested cases, housing providers had counsel more than
twice as often as tenants; moreover, lay persons representing large housing providers have frequently achieved a level of technical expertise and competence in

rent control arcana. Every year, many tenant petitions are dismissed, thirty-seven

171

Id.
172 Askin v. D.C. Rental Hous. Comm'n, 521 A. 2d 669, 675 (D.C. 1987).
173 Drayton v. Poretsky, 462 A.2d 1115, 1119 (D.C. 1983) (At that time, more than a 100,000
actions for possession were brought annually).,
174 Goodman v. D.C. Rental Hous. Comm'n, 573 A2d 1293 (D.C., 1990).
175 See e.g. Unitary Rent Ceiling Adjustment Amendment Act of 1992, D.C. Law 9-191,
§§ 2908.6 and 2908.7, 40 DCR 2184 (April 2, 1993), and its notice provisions for taking and timing of
unimplemented rent ceiling increases. The Rental Housing Committee of the D.C. Bar drafted the
instructions to render the key provisions intelligible to lay persons and lawyers, many of whom including the author relied upon its teachings. That reliance was ill-founded. Sawyer, supra, utterly contradicted the article's statements regarding perfecting annual increases. Practitioners rarely agree on the
meaning of the notorious footnote five in the Sawyer opinion. Sawyer Property Mgmt. of Md., Inc.v.
D.C. Rental Housing Commission, 877 A.2d 96 (D.C. 1996).
176 Goodman v. D.C. Rental Hous. Comm'n, 573 A2d 1293 (D.C., 1990).
177 Of eighty-two adjudicated cases in 2009, the tenants had counsel in eighteen cases.
178 In 182 cases, twenty-eight cases had counsel on record.
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in 2009,179 because petitioners fail to appear or otherwise fail to prosecute. Both
delays and complexity may be significant factors in those dismissals.
Precisely because the Act is confounding, petition procedure should be accessible to pro se parties, particularly when tenants raise the ostensibly non-technical
claims of housing code violations or retaliation. In the following respects, OAH

procedures were not sufficiently user-friendly at the inception of AL
adjudication:
* Rent Control documents, such as registration statements, needed to be certified and copied; the first requirement is bureaucratic and time-consuming
while the second requirement is expensive;
* Subpoenas were and are expensive and not easily obtainable;
" Evidentiary requirements are overly stringent in some instances; for example, the exclusion of inspection reports absent the sponsoring presence of
the inspector;
" ALJs do not as a matter of course continue matters in order to permit pro se
petitioners to amend when it is evident that the tenant has not checked the
appropriate section(s) in a tenant petition;
* Basic and essential discovery is unavailable 0unless the tenant brings a mo-

18
tion to have the case certified as complex;
* ALJs apparently approve all settlement agreements without a glance at the
18 1
merits;
* Tenant associations having fewer
than fifty one percent of the members are
182
denied standing to bring cases;
179 Eighteen percent of matters resolved without hearings for which FOIA requests have provided data.
180 In a letter to Lisa Coleman, General Counsel, Office of Administrative Hearings, Joanna
Shreve, the Chief Tenant Advocate and tenant advocates and tenant organizations urged that the
discovery rule be expanded to make discovery a matter of right in landlord petitions. As of February,
2009, most of the suggestions in the letter have not been implemented. Expedited, limited, discovery
ought to as of right in tenant petitions as well. Letter from Joanna Shreve, Chief Tenant Advocate, to
Lisa Coleman, General Counsel, Office of Administrative Hearings (copy on file with author). In
January of 2009, at least one tenant advocate of Bread for the City took the occasion of hearings on
the nomination of the chief administrative law judge's nomination to the Office of Administrative
Hearings before the Committee on Public Safety and the Judiciary to note the following: "A committee attempting to revise OAH's rules has met for years and has little to show for it." Hearingon the
Nomination of ChiefAdministrative Law Judge Nomination to the Office of Administrative Hearings
Before the Committee on PublicSafety and Judiciary (Jan. 15, 2010) (statement of Stacy Braverman,
Bread for the City).
181 In the Coleman letter, Ms. Shreve and the tenant advocates proposed "to make explicit a
judge's obligation to review any settlement agreement to ensure that it is in the best interest of the
parties, especially pro se litigants." Judges generally eschew monitoring settlements for fairness, because adequate fairness hearings may well entail collateral litigation. See Letter from Joanna Shreve
to Lisa Coleman, supra note 194.
182 In the Coleman letter, this is the second point. Id.
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183
* Speedy justice is denied when decisions are unduly delayed;

184
" Time computation and time allowances were unduly complicated;
" Important documents, such as initial notices to parties and case management

orders, are unavailable in Spanish; confidential Spanish interpretation between parties and their counsel during mediation is inadequate.185
In addition, pro se tenants have not been advised that their petitions may be

utterly futile for two of the most common claims if they are seeking monetary
damages. Petitioners, in units with high rent ceilings, may be utterly foreclosed
from obtaining damages for violations occurring before August 3, 2006.186 Likewise, petitioners alleging retaliation should be apprised that they will obtain no
tangible relief. 187 Much time could be saved if Petitioners were thoroughly ad-

vised at the outset about these obstacles. In addition, appeal requirements are
overly complex for pro se appellants. In sharp contrast to filing a notice of appeal

to the D.C. Court of Appeals, petitioners appealing to the Rental Housing Commission must comprehensively lay out their arguments in the initial notice of appeal. Pro se appellants lack both knowledge and the sophistication to state

succinctly the failings of the administrative opinion. 188 The Commission acknowledged that unrepresented petitioners ought to be afforded some leniency.' 89 Finally, "language line" interpreters are insufficiently reliable. Although the
interpreters are more highly skilled than their RAD predecessors, delays are all
too frequent: interpreters are routinely disconnected and thereafter unavailable;
interpreters occasionally lack a full command of English; interpreters neglect to
183 In the first pages of this article, those delays have been amply demonstrated and are ongoing in some instances. In the Coleman letter, the signatories listed this concern and generally considered proposing a "motion to expedite" or OAH developing and making available a case tracking
system that would identify delays and chronic AL laggards. These tepid proposals are probably insufficient. See Id.
184 The Coleman signatories propose a uniform ten day rule. See Id. at 2.
185 The Coleman signatories also mention the translation issue. Other tenant counsel in interviews with the author, while generally satisfied by the language line interpreters, would prefer to have
at least one interpreter available to assist in discreet conversations between clients and attorneys for
mediation and other private tactical discussions.
186 D.C. CODE § 42-3502.06 (2001); Afshar v. D.C. Rental Hous. Comm'm, 504 A.2d 1105,
1106-07 (D.C. 1986); and Kemp v. Marshall Heights Cmty. Dev., TP 24,786 (RHC Aug. 1, 2000). This
point may be moot since rent ceilings have been abolished, but there are likely several remanded
cases that still contain the rent ceiling trap to be discussed at some length in Part II of the article.
187 D.C. CODE § 42-3509.01(b) (2001) and 14 D.C. MUN. REGS. § 4303.6 (2004).
188 D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 14, § 3802.5 (2004) (requires a concise statement of the Rent Administrator's error in the notice of appeal); see, e.g. Angela Gardner v. Charles C. Davis Real Mgmt.
Realty, TP 24,955 , 40-45 (RHC May 11, 2001) (dismissing the appeal for failure to detail the basis of
the appeal.); see also Jordan v. Spellios, TP 24, 696 (RHC Sept. 8, 1999); Battle v. McElvenene, TP
24, 725 (RHC May 18, 2000); and Redmond v. Majerle Mgmt., Inc., TP 23, 146 (RHC 2002).
189 Walker v. Cascade Mgmt., TP 27,197 (2008) (citing Lustine Realty v. Pinson, TP 20,117,
(RHC Jan. 13, 1989) (noted that the standard for unrepresented parties might not be as stringent.))
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interpret all0 oral statements; and court certified interpreters are not always
9
available.'

The most fundamental problem for pro se litigants is not, however, procedural
complexity or "the structural dynamics" of the forum, but rather the tenants'
limited grasp of the law's complexity and the limited relief the law affords.'

91

The

law is at least as complex as D.C. eviction law and its "mystical" formulations
may be less intuitively grasped.
At the very least, pro se tenants should have been forewarned by bold and

large type that high rent ceilings would thwart "conditions" claims existing prior
to August 2006, and that alternative forums might be more appropriate. 192 Similarly, tenants should be warned in plain language that retaliation claims are not
worthwhile if their primary goal is monetary damages.' 93 RAD should distribute

plain language checklists, referencing the Act and the regulations that enumerate
the multitude of rent increase defenses, including the ubiquitous Sawyer defenses.' 94 Appropriate information kiosks for both landlords and tenants would
also be helpful.

190 The Clinic hoped that the system would correct most of its interpreting glitches. It had not,
at least, on July 19, 2008, in Benitez v. Ogden Gardens, Inc., where the Administrative Law Judge and
the parties were inconvenienced and frustrated by the multiple interpreter-caused delays. Benitez v.
Ogden Gardens, RH-TP 08-29189 (OAH Apr. 1, 2009).
191 Professor Baldacci in her\his discussion of the New York City Housing Court observes "the
fundamental problem for pro se litigants in having their defenses or claims heard is not primarily their
lack of information or understanding, but the structural dynamics of the Housing Court which work to
silence the pro se litigant even when she has some knowledge regarding claims and defenses." Paris
Baldacci, The New York City Housing Court in the 21st Century: Can it Better Address the Problems
Before it?: Assuring Access to Justice: The Role of the Judge in Assisting Pro Se Litigants in Litigating
their Cases in New York City's Housing Court, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y AND ETHics J. 659, 661-62
(2006).
192 This short and plain warning should of course be tendered pre-filing: "Warning: if you are
filing a claim for reductions in services that includes services reduced before August, 2006, you should
first determine what your rental unit's "rent ceiling"' is. If the rent ceiling is substantially higher than
the rent you are being charged, you are extremely unlikely to receive any monetary damages. This is
because..."
193 Proposed Warning: "if you are alleging that the landlord retaliated against you, then you
should be aware that you will not receive any monetary damages if you succeed in your claim. A fine
may be assessed against the landlord only if the judge finds that the landlord's retaliation was "knowing and willful." Realistically, that fine is unlikely to be paid."
194 The Sawyer defenses were ubiquitous, but will soon become obsolete as a result of the Rent
Control Amendments Act. See The Rent Control Reform Amendment Act of 2006 D.C. CODE § 423502.05 (2001). In addition, there is no question that some tenants may prefer the simplicity of one
allegation; the lion's share of the clinic's intakes are tenants who have filed petitions alleging that
their rent increase is illegal because of the poor conditions. The OTA may be better equipped to
routinely review petitions for comprehensiveness before they are filed. Petitions filed after August,
2009, will be controlled by one, simpler, law.
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ALJs should do their part to facilitate justice. They should provide active procedural "reasonable intervention" to unsophisticated pro se parties.1'

Judicial

passivity, long identified with judicial impartiality, will not ensure that justice and
fairness are achieved for pro se litigants. 96 Nothing in the judicial canons of ethics prevents reasonable intervention.197 Judicial assistance rendered evenhandedly to all unrepresented parties should be permissible and is desirable. 98 If a
tenant testifies she does not recall precisely when housing code violations oc-

curred, then the ALJ as a matter of course should use her considerable trial experience to ferret out the best answer. 19 9 If a tenant testifies that she regularly
informed the landlord of various problems, then the AU should predictably elicit

the time frame. Similarly, if a tenant alleges that she was heatless for an entire
winter, but neglected to allege a reduction in services, then the AJ should predictably offer to continue the matter and appropriately amend the petition.2 °°
Similarly, pertinent truth-eliciting questions should be posed to unsophisticated

landlords and short continuances should be offered until the court is satisfied that
the merits of all significant viable claims are considered. An AJ is ideally situated to ensure both fairness and some measure of justice.
V.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The new system of AL adjudication in combination with a rejuvenated tenant

bar and the Office of Tenant Advocate has provided a somewhat effective administrative forum for tenants. Most laudable is the quality of the AlJs and the
impressive numbers of cases resolved even in their first three years of existence.
195 Russell Engler, Ethics in Transition: Unrepresented Litigants and the ChangingJudicialRole,
22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS AND PUBLIC POL'Y, 367 (2008). Engler has written extensively on pro se
litigation and provides a state of the court discussion of recent developments and proposals in this
article. Id.
196 Id. at 395.
197 Id. at 394.
198 Goodman v. D.C. Rental Hous. Comm'n is not to the contrary. The Goodman court was
primarily concerned that a pro se petitioner's record below was insufficient for it to be addressed by
the court. Nothing in the opinion suggested that pertinent questions by a Hearing Examiner would
have been improper. In fact, the court stressed that the remedial nature of the stature was an important consideration in resolving procedural issues. Superior Court Judges sitting in LT Court and elsewhere in Superior Court frequently examine or cross examine parties at some length. The judge in the
recent Stancil case was aggressive with both parties. Stancil v. Bugg-Bey, LT 023510-09 (2009).
199 Conditions cases may well involve four or more years of dire violations, occurring at different times. Tenants do not live in anticipation of litigation. Many are illiterate and most of our clients
do not write in English. In these circumstances, nailing down exact or even general time frames may
be extraordinarily difficult, the knottiest trial advocacy challenge for tenant advocates.
200 In a recent case alleging no heat for three winters, one the most severe "conditions cases"
tried at OAH, the tenants failed to allege reduction in services and received nothing for the lack of
heat. Luisa Cabrera v. Nigatu & Begasha Bedada, RH-TP-07-28998 (OAH 2008). After finding that
the housing provider was not entitled to an exemption, the ALJ found that a rent increase was unlawful and ordered a refund on that basis only. Id.
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The Rental Housing Commission continues to produce many well-reasoned opinions that are mostly affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
A.

Delays

Nonetheless, delays in the many matters that are actually adjudicated continue
unabated and utterly thwart expeditious and effective resolution of rental housing matters. In "conditions cases," the long delays persist and should induce petitioners to seek speedy justice in other forums. Although this study does not focus
on methodologies which successfully expedite litigation, some common sense suggestions seem to be self-evident. The Rental Housing Commission should take
prompt and effective steps to ameliorate those persistent delays, including the
following:
1. Delegate routine procedural matters (the bulk of the RHC caseload) to
staff attorney(s), paralegals, or student interns.
2. Reduce the number of remands by correcting simple factual matters evident
from the record, such as flawed interest calculations.
3. Require parties with counsel to advert more specifically to the record or
provide transcripts of the error below.
4. Prioritize cases that have endured shuttlecock remands, even when they are
more complex than more recent matters.
5. Appoint pro bono counsel for indigent parties.
6. Require that each Commissioner to complete at least once substantive
"merits" decision per week.
The Office of Administrative Hearings should take similar measures, including
the following:
1. Require ALJs to finish their written decisions within one month of the close
of evidence. In exceptional circumstances, particularly complex or long
cases, ALJs could be afforded three months.
2. Afford ALJs with backlogs more time to write decisions by strictly deferring new mediations or hearings.2 0 1
3. Require ALJs, who are inexperienced in rental housing matters, to handle
rental-housing matters exclusively for at least six months to enable them to
become familiar with the Act's intricacies.
4. Require that ALJs write cases in strict chronological order based on the
date of their hearings.
5. Borrow case management techniques from the D.C. Superior Court and the
D.C. Court of Appeals, which have enabled those courts to reduce delays.
201 Several ALJs who had not written opinions in the Clinic's cases of (on average one and one
half years after hearing) had busy mediation schedules and were resolving new cases. The author has
tallied this activity from the 2009 cases received in FOIA requests.
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6. Appreciate more fully that litigation delays in some instance have dire effects on tenants and that the forum may fall into utter disrepute unless
there is a meaningful fix.
B.

Pro Se Friendliness

In its present location, RAD/OAH is receiving a torrent of petitions, the large
majority of which are pro se tenant petitions. In order for AU adjudication of
rental housing matters to realize its full potential, OAI-\RAD should take the
following steps:
1. Facilitate pro se litigation by ensuring that tenants appreciate both the variety and complexity of rental housing act remedies. An "OTA" attorney,
with expertise in Rental Housing Act claims, should be available to assist
tenants with the myriad technical and obscure claims that may have more
merit than reduction in services cases.2 °2 The working assumption of those
attorneys should be that tenants with meritorious claims for reduction in
services likely have other meritorious claims. OAH or the OTA should provide painstakingly accurate checklists of defenses to rent increases.
2. Facilitate pro se representation by reducing the costs of duplicating certified
documents that may be essential to their cases. When the litigants are pro
se, RAD should provide at least three years worth of certified filings to the
AU hearing the case.
3. ALJs should assist unrepresented parties in making their cases. Presenting
the details of three or more years of dilapidated conditions is a formidable
undertaking.
4. ALJs should inform pro se parties when they have not stated a claim that
will afford them tangible relief.
5. RAD\OAH should prevail upon the city to revive the notion that one centralized Agency in close proximity to other related departments such as
housing inspectors, relevant licenses, and the Rental Housing Commission
is ideal for pro se litigants. Close proximity to D.C. Superior Court is essential to its success.2 ° 3
6. ALJs should set cases involving complicated, multi-party, or parties needing
English interpretation for two or move successive days.
202 The model would roughly duplicate on a much smaller scale the legal services and law
students presence at Superior Court. Ad hoc temporary representation might be appropriate in some
instances.
203 In January 2008, the RAD, but not OAH or RHC or DCRA, moved to Southeast Washington D.C. The persisting difficulties of obtaining all necessary documents for Tenant petitions will be
compounded by the multiple locations. This severe inconvenience might significantly reduce the number tenants and attorneys willing to adjudicate at OAH.
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7. ALJs should mediate only if the mediation is voluntary and previously
scheduled. ALJs should not assume that effective mediation is a cure for or
mitigation of adjudicatory delays
8. ALs should provide pro se tenants with checklists provided by the Agency,
denoting all documents necessary for the hearing.
CONCLUSION

The 2006 reorganization in the administrative adjudication of rental housing
matters has brought much needed but still insufficient improvement to a longtroubled system. On the positive side, the new ALJs represent a marked improvement in professionalism, legal reasoning, and expeditious resolution of matters that do not proceed to trial. Several recent settlements and final decisions
have been sufficiently generous that tenants and their counselors have new reason to consider the RAD/OAH as an effective forum for pursuing redress of their
housing grievances. While Superior Court remains unparalleled in the opportunities for redress that it offers tenants, the recent restructuring makes RAD/OAH
newly attractive especially in cases that combine illegal rent levels and tawdry
conditions.
These commendable improvements notwithstanding, long-standing problems
in RAD\OAH litigation persist, as the foregoing analysis makes clear. The inefficient multi-tiered appeals process both continues, and virtually ensures, the indefensible tradition of justice delayed, often interminably. Unless and until the
RHC revises its procedures to enable far more timely and expeditious decisions,
administrative litigation will continue to both frustrate and enrage many D.C.
petitioners who have turned to it for the vindication of their rights to affordable,
safe, and sanitary housing.
Similarly, myriad changes need to be made in the actual procedures used at
RAD\OAH, from initial counseling and support for those seeking redress, to
greater willingness on the part of the ALJs and other officials to assist pro se
petitioners in navigating the issues of their cases. Many of the needed changes are
detailed in the recommendations above. Absent proactive administrative and judicial changes, many petitioners will continue to find that rights obscured are
rights denied.
Finally, and by no means least, as discussed at length in Part II of this article,
the ALJs should seize the opportunity of this transition to set new standards for
transparency and consistency in their reasoning. With their regime still relatively
new and in formation, this is a promising time for ALJs to begin setting precedential benchmarks that can provide consistent guidance on whole categories of
petition issues. At the very minimum, they have an obligation as well as an opportunity to make their reasoning and the benchmark precedents they have consulted explicit and accessible.
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It is premature to celebrate the 2006 reorganization as the end of a dismal era
and the long sought inauguration of an effective administrative forum. Festering
problems remain and these problems will be exacerbated by the anticipated volume of appeals to the RHC. Absent resolution of these problems, the RAD/
OAH/RHC will continue to be troubled legal forums for many petitioners in the
District of Columbia.

